## Facts

- A federal grand jury indicted Kenneth Charles Rogers for (1) possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic protection order, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), and (2) possessing a firearm after a misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
- At the government’s request, a magistrate judge held a detention hearing under the Bail Reform Act (BRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).
- After reviewing pretrial services materials and hearing argument, the magistrate judge ordered Rogers detained pending trial, finding a serious risk of danger to others or the community.
- Rogers sought district-court review, arguing the charged firearm-possession offenses were not “crime[s] of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), so the government had no statutory right to a detention hearing.
- The district court agreed, concluded the government was not entitled to a detention hearing on the charged offenses, and entered a release order.
- The United States appealed the release order.

## Issues

1. Whether violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) qualify as “crime[s] of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), triggering the government’s right to a BRA detention hearing.
2. If so, whether the district court erred by releasing Rogers after a magistrate judge had ordered detention following a detention hearing.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s release order.
- The court held that violations of § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) are “crime[s] of violence” within the meaning of the BRA.
- Because the offenses qualify, the government was entitled to a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(1)(A).
- The case was remanded with instructions to reinstate the detention findings made after the detention hearing and to order Rogers detained pending trial.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), the government may obtain a detention hearing when the case involves a “crime of violence.”
- For BRA purposes, a “crime of violence” includes a felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against a person or property may be used in committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4).
- Firearm-possession offenses tied to domestic protection orders (§ 922(g)(8)) and domestic-violence misdemeanor convictions (§ 922(g)(9)) categorically involve a heightened risk of physical force because they target persons judicially found to pose a domestic threat or persons with prior domestic-violence convictions.
- When an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence,” a detention hearing held under § 3142(f)(1)(A) is authorized, and detention determinations made after that hearing may be reinstated if a later release order rested on an incorrect legal classification of the offense.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit held that firearm possession by persons subject to domestic protection orders or convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Bail Reform Act, entitling the government to a detention hearing and requiring reinstatement of the magistrate judge’s pretrial detention order.


United States v. Rogers, 371 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2004)