## Facts

- Neil Saada and his son, Isaac Saada, owned and operated Scrimshaw Handicrafts, a New Jersey business dealing in high-value goods and facing severe financial distress.
- The government alleged the Saadas arranged an insurance fraud involving a deliberately flooded warehouse area and a resulting water-damage claim submitted to Chubb Insurance.
- The Saadas worked with Ezra Rishty (Isaac’s cousin), a public insurance adjuster with a history of fraudulent claims, to submit inflated inventories and forged invoices.
- The claimed loss was substantially inflated, and the insurer paid approximately $865,000; Rishty received about $270,000 and distributed funds to other participants.
- After federal searches of Rishty’s business, Rishty was arrested, pleaded guilty in connection with multiple frauds, and testified for the government against the Saadas.
- At trial, the government also introduced (and the defense contested) evidence involving a deceased, disbarred state judge (Yaccarino) and other-acts evidence relating to Rishty.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that, after trial, cooperating witness Rishty attempted to induce false testimony in an unrelated case.
2. Whether challenged evidentiary rulings—including admission of a deceased declarant’s statement and related impeachment/rehabilitation under Rules 804(b)(3) and 806, and admission of other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b)—required reversal.
3. Whether the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument constituted improper vouching for government witnesses.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions for conspiracy, mail fraud, and wire fraud, and affirmed denial of the Rule 33 motion.
- The court held the post-trial evidence of Rishty’s misconduct was cumulative impeachment and did not satisfy Rule 33’s requirement that it would probably produce an acquittal.
- The court concluded the district court erred in admitting certain evidence related to the deceased judge, but the error was harmless in light of the overall record and limited significance of the challenged material.
- The court upheld admission of other-acts evidence regarding another Rishty fraud as probative of the defendants’ intent, knowledge, motive, and absence of mistake, with limiting instructions and without unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative value.
- The court rejected the vouching claim, finding the rebuttal comments were tied to record evidence and did not imply governmental guarantees of credibility or extra-record knowledge.

## Legal Principles

- A Rule 33 new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence requires proof that the evidence is newly discovered, diligence was exercised, the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, it is material, and it would probably produce an acquittal.
- Newly discovered evidence that primarily adds impeachment of an already heavily impeached witness generally fails Rule 33’s “not merely cumulative or impeaching” and “probable acquittal” requirements.
- Rule 404(b) permits other-acts evidence for non-propensity purposes (including intent, knowledge, motive, and absence of mistake) subject to Rule 403 balancing and appropriate limiting instructions.
- Rule 806 does not operate as a general substitute for cross-examination of an unavailable hearsay declarant; erroneous admission or misuse of such evidence may be treated as harmless if it did not affect the verdict.
- Improper prosecutorial vouching occurs when the prosecutor assures credibility based on personal knowledge or governmental prestige, or implies support from facts outside the record; argument grounded in trial evidence is permissible.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld the Saadas’ fraud convictions, concluding that post-trial evidence impeaching a cooperating witness was cumulative and unlikely to change the verdict, that any error tied to evidence about an unavailable declarant was harmless, that limited other-acts evidence was properly admitted for intent and knowledge, and that the prosecutor’s rebuttal stayed within the trial record and did not constitute vouching.


United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000)