## Facts

- Stephen A. Saccoccia was indicted for RICO conspiracy and multiple money-laundering offenses; the indictment sought forfeiture of extensive property, including nearly $137 million in currency and, if unavailable, other property of equivalent value.
- The district court entered a restraining order under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) barring transfers of property identified as forfeitable in the indictment.
- After entry of the restraining order, Saccoccia arranged fee payments totaling more than $1.38 million to three defense attorneys: Jack Hill, Kenneth O’Donnell, and Stephen J. Finta.
- Saccoccia was convicted, and the district court ordered forfeiture of the $137 million specified in the indictment; the conviction and forfeiture were affirmed on direct appeal.
- After learning of the fee payments, the government moved to compel the attorneys to turn over the fees as forfeitable property.
- The district court ordered the attorneys to forfeit specified amounts of fees traceable to forfeitable assets, including amounts attributable to postconviction services, even though the attorneys had largely spent the funds.
- The attorneys appealed, arguing the statute did not permit recovery from their own untainted assets and raising constitutional objections, including due process and Sixth Amendment concerns.

## Issues

1. Whether criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 permits recovery of the value of restrained, forfeitable proceeds paid to attorneys and later dissipated, through a money judgment enforceable against the attorneys’ other assets.
2. Whether attorneys who knowingly received and spent funds transferred in violation of a forfeiture restraining order may be compelled to disgorge those amounts (or equivalent value).
3. Whether ordering disgorgement of earned, spent legal fees violates due process or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or otherwise exceeds statutory authority.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed the order requiring the attorneys to forfeit specified amounts of fees.
- The court held that criminal forfeiture is an in personam component of the sentence and may be implemented through a money judgment equal to the value of forfeitable property.
- Because the attorneys received and dissipated funds covered by a restraining order and traceable to forfeitable proceeds, they could be compelled to forfeit those amounts or pay equivalent value even if payment came from other assets.
- The court rejected constitutional objections, reasoning that there is no constitutional entitlement to use or retain tainted assets for attorney compensation when those assets are properly restrained and adjudicated forfeitable.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal forfeiture under RICO is in personam and may be satisfied via a money judgment for the value of forfeitable property, not limited to recovery of specific, identifiable dollars.
- Where forfeitable property is transferred or dissipated, the forfeiture statute authorizes recovery of equivalent value through substitute-property mechanisms.
- A transferee who knowingly accepts and spends property transferred in violation of a forfeiture restraining order may be held liable to disgorge the property or its value.
- The Sixth Amendment does not protect payment of counsel fees with assets that are restrained as forfeitable and later adjudicated forfeitable; due process is satisfied where forfeiture enforcement follows valid restraint and conviction-based forfeiture.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit upheld an order requiring defense attorneys to return, or pay equivalent value for, fees received from assets restrained as forfeitable in a RICO prosecution, holding that criminal forfeiture supports money-judgment enforcement against an obligor’s other assets when tainted funds have been knowingly received and dissipated, and that neither due process nor the Sixth Amendment bars such relief.


United States v. Saccoccia, 354 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003)