## Facts

- David H. Safavian served as deputy chief of staff and then chief of staff at the General Services Administration (GSA) in 2002.
- Safavian had a long-standing personal and professional relationship with lobbyist Jack Abramoff, who sought information and assistance relating to GSA-controlled properties, including White Oak (Maryland) and the Old Post Office (Washington, D.C.).
- Abramoff invited Safavian on a privately chartered trip to Scotland and London in August 2002.
- Safavian requested ethics clearance from GSA counsel to accept the trip’s air transportation, representing that Abramoff had “no business before GSA” and that Safavian would pay his own expenses for lodging, meals, and golf.
- Relying on Safavian’s representations, GSA ethics personnel approved the trip as permissible under gift rules.
- Safavian gave Abramoff a $3,100 check before departure, which he claimed he believed would cover trip costs.
- Later investigations by the GSA Inspector General and a Senate committee examined the accuracy and completeness of Safavian’s statements about whether Abramoff had “business before GSA” and whether Safavian omitted Abramoff’s interests in GSA properties when questioned.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) for “conceal[ing] or cover[ing] up” material facts, as opposed to mere nondisclosure, in Safavian’s ethics-related communications.
2. Whether Safavian’s statements that Abramoff had “no business before GSA” were knowingly false under § 1001 given the ambiguity of “business before” an agency.
3. Whether the allegedly false statements or omissions were material to the relevant agency and congressional investigations.
4. Whether the evidence supported obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, including whether the charged conduct had the required connection to a “proceeding” and was capable of influencing it.
5. Whether excluding defense expert testimony on the professional meaning of “doing business” with an agency was erroneous and prejudicial.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the judgments of conviction on all counts.
- As to § 1001(a)(1), the court held the government did not prove “concealment” because the statute requires more than silence; it requires a trick, scheme, device, or a duty to disclose.
- The court concluded the government did not establish falsity and intent beyond a reasonable doubt where “business before GSA” was undefined and reasonably susceptible to a narrower meaning.
- The court held the district court erred by excluding expert testimony about how government-contracting professionals commonly understand “doing business” with an agency, evidence bearing directly on Safavian’s state of mind.
- As to § 1505, the court found the proof insufficient as charged to show materially obstructive conduct with an adequate relationship to the identified proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) concealment liability requires more than a failure to volunteer information; the government must show concealment accomplished by a trick, scheme, or device, or a legal duty to disclose.
- A § 1001 conviction cannot rest on answers that are literally true or on a defendant’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term; ambiguity may defeat proof of knowing falsity.
- Materiality requires that a statement or omission have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the decision-making body or investigation at issue.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, obstruction requires proof that the conduct was directed at influencing a pending proceeding and bears a sufficient relationship in time, causation, or logic to that proceeding.
- Expert testimony on specialized usage may be admissible where the meaning of a contested term is central to falsity and intent; improper exclusion may warrant reversal.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit reversed Safavian’s convictions because the government’s § 1001 theory treated nondisclosure as concealment, relied on an ambiguous phrase (“business before GSA”) to prove falsity and intent, and failed to show material obstruction under § 1505; the trial court’s exclusion of expert evidence on industry meaning further undermined the verdicts.


United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 2008)