## Facts

- Orlando Letelier (a former Chilean ambassador) and Ronni Moffitt were killed in Washington, D.C., when a bomb attached to Letelier’s car was detonated by remote control on September 21, 1976.
- The prosecution theory linked the assassination plot to Chile’s intelligence service and alleged that operatives sought assistance from members associated with an anti-Castro organization.
- A central government witness, Michael Townley, testified pursuant to a plea agreement and described the planning and execution of the bombing and the defendants’ alleged roles.
- A federal grand jury indicted multiple individuals; only Guillermo Novo Sampol, Alvin Ross Diaz, and Ignacio Novo Sampol were tried in this proceeding.
- Guillermo Novo and Ross were tried on conspiracy and murder-related counts; Guillermo and Ignacio were also tried on grand jury false-declaration counts, and Ignacio was additionally tried for misprision of felony.
- At trial, the government introduced testimony from two jailhouse informants about incriminating statements Guillermo Novo and Ross allegedly made while in custody after indictment.
- The defense sought to cross-examine a government witness about religious practices to impeach credibility; the trial court limited this inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 610.
- Ignacio sought severance, arguing that trying his perjury and misprision charges alongside the high-profile homicide charges would create spillover prejudice; the trial court denied severance.
- The jury convicted each defendant on all counts charged against him.

## Issues

1. Whether admitting jailhouse-informant testimony regarding post-indictment custodial statements violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the informants acted as government agents who deliberately elicited incriminating information.
2. Whether limiting cross-examination about a witness’s religious beliefs or practices was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 610.
3. Whether denying severance for Ignacio Novo, charged only with perjury and misprision, resulted in prejudicial joinder given the inflammatory evidence tied to the homicide counts against co-defendants.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the convictions of all three defendants and remanded.
- As to Guillermo Novo and Ross, the court held the admission of jailhouse-informant testimony violated the Sixth Amendment because the informants functioned as government agents who deliberately elicited incriminating statements after indictment; the error was not harmless.
- As to Ignacio Novo, the court held the denial of severance created undue prejudice because the joint trial exposed him to extensive murder-related evidence largely irrelevant to his perjury and misprision charges.
- The court addressed Rule 610, recognizing limits on using religious belief to impeach credibility while noting that certain inquiries may be permissible if directed to perception or bias, but the Sixth Amendment and joinder errors independently required reversal.

## Legal Principles

- After the right to counsel attaches, the government may not use agents (including jailhouse informants) to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from an indicted defendant outside counsel’s presence; statements obtained in violation of this rule are inadmissible.
- A jailhouse informant may be treated as a government agent based on the nature of the informant’s relationship with authorities and whether the informant was positioned or incentivized to obtain statements.
- Under Federal Rule of Evidence 610, evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is generally inadmissible to attack or support credibility, though inquiry may be allowed if aimed at a non-credibility purpose such as bias or impaired perception.
- Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 requires severance when a joint trial poses a serious risk of spillover prejudice that cannot be cured by limiting instructions, particularly where a defendant faces comparatively minor charges alongside inflammatory evidence on unrelated major offenses.

## Conclusion

The court set aside all convictions because the government’s use of jailhouse informants to obtain post-indictment statements violated the Sixth Amendment as to the homicide defendants, and because trying a perjury/misprision defendant together with highly prejudicial murder evidence required severance; the cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with those rulings.


United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980)