## Facts

- Federal agents investigated alleged money laundering and drug trafficking connected to Eagle Motors, a used-car dealership in Arlington, Virginia.
- Mohammad Sarihifard worked at Eagle Motors from 1994 to 1995 and was a close friend of the dealership’s owner.
- The investigation focused in part on a 1995 Nissan Pathfinder that agents believed was tied to illicit proceeds and that Sarihifard held as a straw owner.
- In January 1996, Sarihifard told agents he bought the Pathfinder for personal use and sold it two weeks later to “Deborah Mills” for a $1,000 profit; agents believed he was lying.
- A prosecutor convened a grand jury investigating the suspected laundering operation, advised Sarihifard of his Fifth Amendment rights, and obtained his testimony.
- Before the grand jury, Sarihifard repeated the same account about purchasing and reselling the Pathfinder.
- At trial, witnesses testified that another person (Jones) actually purchased the Pathfinder.
- The prosecutor later instructed the grand jury to disregard Sarihifard’s testimony for purposes of examining possible illegal activity at Eagle Motors.
- A jury convicted Sarihifard of perjury before a grand jury (18 U.S.C. § 1623(a)) and making false statements to federal agents (18 U.S.C. § 1001), and the district court sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines.

## Issues

1. Whether Sarihifard’s false grand jury testimony was “material” under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) where the prosecutor suspected it was false and later told the grand jury to disregard it.
2. Whether Sarihifard’s false statements to federal agents were material under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and whether a limiting “exculpatory no” theory barred liability.
3. Whether the district court correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines in imposing a 21-month sentence.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and the 21-month sentence.
- The court held the grand jury testimony was material because it was capable of influencing or impeding the grand jury’s investigative function, even if it did not affect a final charging decision and even if the prosecutor suspected falsity.
- The court held the statements to federal agents were material because they were capable of affecting the investigation into the Pathfinder transaction and related suspected crimes; § 1001 applied on these facts.
- The court rejected the argument that the prosecutor’s prior knowledge and decision to call Sarihifard created an improper “perjury trap” that barred prosecution, emphasizing that he was warned of his rights and chose to testify falsely.
- The court found no reversible error in the district court’s Guidelines calculations or enhancements and upheld the sentence.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), materiality is satisfied when a false statement has a natural tendency or capacity to influence, mislead, or impede a grand jury proceeding, including the grand jury’s general investigative work.
- A prosecutor’s suspicion that a witness will lie, or a later instruction to disregard the testimony, does not negate materiality if the statement was capable of affecting the investigation.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a false statement made to federal investigators is material if it is capable of influencing the agency’s investigative functions; false narratives that hinder tracing ownership and financial trails can meet this standard.
- Advising a witness of Fifth Amendment rights before grand jury testimony supports the legitimacy of perjury prosecution when the witness nonetheless testifies falsely.
- Appellate review of Sentencing Guidelines application will affirm where the record shows no miscalculation or legal error in applying relevant enhancements.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit upheld perjury and false-statement convictions arising from lies about a suspect vehicle transaction, holding that materiality turns on a statement’s capacity to affect investigative functions—regardless of the prosecutor’s prior knowledge or later efforts to neutralize the testimony—and affirmed the district court’s Guidelines-based 21-month sentence.


United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 1998)