## Facts

- Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, an imprisoned leader associated with the Islamic Group (IG), was subject to Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) restricting communications.
- The government alleged IG was a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and that defendants sought to facilitate communications between Rahman and IG figures outside prison.
- Defendants included alleged IG members Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Yassir Al-Sirri, Rahman’s attorney Lynne Stewart, and interpreter Mohammed Yousry.
- The indictment alleged Stewart and Yousry conveyed Rahman’s messages to others (including through the media) while representing compliance with SAMs.
- The government charged that facilitating such communications constituted material support to an FTO and also formed part of a conspiracy to interfere with lawful enforcement of SAMs.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was unconstitutionally vague as applied to alleged provision of “communications equipment” and “personnel” through message-passing and related services.
2. Whether § 2339B was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment as applied to communications and expressive activity.
3. Whether criminal defendants could collaterally challenge the Secretary of State’s designation of IG as an FTO in this prosecution.
4. Whether the Attorney General and Bureau of Prisons had authority to impose and enforce SAMs, and whether evasion of SAMs could support a conspiracy-to-defraud-the-United-States charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371.

## Decision

- The court granted the motions to dismiss in part and denied them in part.
- The court held that the § 2339B terms “communications equipment” and “personnel” were unconstitutionally vague as applied to the charged conduct and dismissed Counts One and Two to that extent.
- The court otherwise sustained Counts One and Two, rejecting broader constitutional attacks on § 2339B.
- The court upheld the legality of the SAMs and allowed the § 371 conspiracy-to-defraud theory to proceed insofar as it alleged obstruction of lawful SAM enforcement.
- The court held defendants could not litigate the validity of IG’s FTO designation in this criminal case.

## Legal Principles

- A criminal statute is void for vagueness as applied when it fails to give fair notice that the charged conduct is prohibited and permits arbitrary enforcement in the specific context presented.
- As applied to professional services tied to attorney-client communications and interpretation, the § 2339B categories “communications equipment” and “personnel” lacked sufficiently clear standards to support prosecution on the alleged theory.
- § 2339B generally targets prohibited conduct of providing material support to an FTO and is not facially invalid on overbreadth grounds merely because it touches communication-related activity; independent advocacy is distinct from coordinated support.
- SAMs limiting a high-risk inmate’s communications may be imposed and enforced under the Attorney General’s and Bureau of Prisons’ statutory and regulatory authority to protect security and prevent further harm.
- A conspiracy to defraud the United States under § 371 may be based on an agreement to frustrate or obstruct lawful government functions, including enforcement of SAMs.
- Congress’s designated review procedures for FTO designations limit collateral attacks on an FTO designation in a criminal prosecution.

## Conclusion

The court partially dismissed the material-support counts only insofar as they relied on the vague-as-applied § 2339B categories “communications equipment” and “personnel,” while preserving the indictment’s remaining theories, upholding the SAMs regime, and barring defendants from contesting the IG’s FTO designation within the criminal case.


United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)