## Facts

- About thirty protestors, including Gregory D. Schoon, Raymond K. Kennon, Jr., and Patricia Manning, entered an Internal Revenue Service office in Tucson, Arizona, to protest U.S. policy toward El Salvador.
- The protestors chanted, splashed simulated blood on office surfaces, and obstructed the office’s operations.
- A federal police officer repeatedly ordered the protestors to disperse; they refused and were arrested.
- The defendants were charged with (1) obstructing IRS office activities and (2) failing to comply with a federal police officer’s order.
- At a bench trial, the defendants sought to present evidence about conditions in El Salvador to support a necessity defense, asserting their conduct was intended to prevent further bloodshed.
- The district court found the defendants acted from humanitarian motives but ruled the necessity defense unavailable as a matter of law and convicted them on both counts.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court properly excluded the necessity defense as a matter of law for protestors who committed indirect civil disobedience.
2. Whether the defendants’ proffer could satisfy necessity requirements of imminent harm, direct causal relation, and lack of legal alternatives.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions.
- The court held that the necessity defense is inapplicable to indirect civil disobedience where defendants violate laws that are not themselves the object of the protest.
- The court held the district court could bar the defense when the offer of proof was legally insufficient to support it.
- A separate concurrence agreed in the result and cautioned against expanding necessity to justify policy-oriented protest crimes.

## Legal Principles

- Necessity requires proof of: (1) choosing the lesser evil, (2) action to prevent imminent harm, (3) a reasonably anticipated direct causal relationship between the act and the harm to be avoided, and (4) no legal alternatives.
- A trial court may exclude a necessity defense before trial (or at trial) when the defendant’s proffered evidence cannot satisfy the elements as a matter of law.
- Indirect civil disobedience—violating a law not specifically targeted by the protest—does not fit the necessity doctrine because:
  - the asserted “harm” is typically the continued existence of a governmental policy, not a legally cognizable imminent harm;
  - the causal chain between the criminal act and prevention of the claimed harm is too attenuated; and
  - lawful political avenues to seek policy change are available, defeating the “no legal alternatives” requirement.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendants’ convictions and rejected necessity, holding that indirect civil disobedience aimed at influencing broad governmental policy cannot be justified by necessity because the alleged harm is not imminent, the causal link is too remote, and lawful alternatives exist.


United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991)