## Facts

- A federal grand jury indicted Pedro Serrano on two counts: (1) felon in possession of ammunition (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and (2) possession of body armor by a violent felon (18 U.S.C. § 931(a)).
- Count One alleged an interstate-commerce nexus for the ammunition; Count Two alleged only that Serrano knowingly possessed a bullet-resistant vest.
- The body-armor statute prohibits violent felons from possessing “body armor,” defined to include only products “sold or offered for sale in interstate or foreign commerce” (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(35)).
- Serrano had a prior New York robbery conviction qualifying as a felony “crime of violence” under federal law.
- Serrano moved to dismiss Count Two for failure to plead the commerce element and on Commerce Clause, vagueness, and Second Amendment grounds.

## Issues

1. Whether Count Two was constitutionally and legally insufficient because it failed to allege the interstate-commerce element embedded in the statutory definition of “body armor.”
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
3. Whether § 931(a) and its incorporated definitions are unconstitutionally vague on their face or as applied.
4. Whether § 931(a)’s restriction on violent felons possessing body armor violates the Second Amendment.

## Decision

- The court dismissed Count Two without prejudice because it failed to allege an essential interstate-commerce element.
- The court denied Serrano’s Commerce Clause challenge, holding that the statute’s jurisdictional limitation to body armor sold or offered in interstate or foreign commerce is sufficient.
- The court denied the vagueness challenge, finding the relevant definitions provided adequate notice and enforceable standards.
- The court denied the Second Amendment challenge, upholding the status-based restriction on violent felons’ possession of body armor.

## Legal Principles

- An indictment must allege every essential element of the offense, including jurisdictional elements placed in definitional provisions incorporated into the offense.
- A statutory “jurisdictional hook” tying prohibited conduct or items to interstate or foreign commerce supports Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
- A statute is not void for vagueness if it gives ordinary people fair notice of what is prohibited and supplies standards that limit arbitrary enforcement.
- Status-based restrictions on possession of weapons-related items by violent felons may be consistent with the Second Amendment.

## Conclusion

Count Two was dismissed because the indictment omitted the interstate-commerce element required by the incorporated definition of “body armor,” but the court upheld § 931(a) against Commerce Clause, vagueness, and Second Amendment challenges and allowed the government to replead the charge in a superseding indictment.


United States v. Serrano, 191 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)