## Facts

- John C. Sheffey drove on Little River Road in Great Smoky Mountains National Park and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Martha Money.
- Money’s passengers were her parents, William and Mamie Shackelford; William Shackelford died, and Money and Mamie Shackelford suffered serious injuries.
- Multiple witnesses described Sheffey’s driving shortly before the crash as erratic and highly dangerous, including speeding on curves, passing in no-passing zones, and cutting corners.
- Ten days before the crash, Sheffey was prescribed a muscle relaxant known to cause drowsiness; he was warned that alcohol could increase drowsiness and that he should not drive if drowsy.
- Evidence indicated that on the day of the crash Sheffey consumed alcohol and took more than the prescribed dosage of the medication.
- A federal grand jury charged Sheffey with second-degree murder and two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury; a jury convicted him on all counts.
- On appeal, Sheffey challenged only the second-degree murder conviction on evidentiary, instructional, sufficiency, prosecutor-recusal, and spectator-prejudice grounds.

## Issues

1. Whether lay witnesses could testify that Sheffey’s driving was “reckless” and in “extreme disregard for human life” under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.
2. Whether the jury instructions improperly blurred the distinction between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, including the meaning of “malice aforethought.”
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove malice aforethought for second-degree murder based on impaired and dangerous driving.
4. Whether the prosecutor’s personal experience with a drunk-driving death required recusal at sentencing, and whether non-recusal was plain error.
5. Whether the presence of anti-drunk-driving spectators wearing buttons, and alleged juror contact, denied Sheffey a fair trial.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed the second-degree murder conviction.
- The court held the lay characterizations of “reckless” driving were admissible as perception-based, helpful shorthand descriptions under Rule 701 and did not usurp the jury’s role.
- The court upheld the instructions distinguishing second-degree murder from involuntary manslaughter, including that malice aforethought may be shown by recklessness amounting to extreme disregard for human life.
- The court found sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find malice aforethought, given Sheffey’s knowledge of the drug’s effects, alcohol use, excessive dosing, and extremely dangerous driving.
- Applying plain-error review, the court rejected the prosecutor-recusal claim due to lack of objection and no showing of actual bias affecting sentencing.
- The court rejected the spectator-prejudice claim raised for the first time on appeal because the record did not show improper influence or a denial of a fair trial.

## Legal Principles

- Lay opinion testimony is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 701 when rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to understanding the testimony or deciding a fact in issue, including common-language descriptions of observed driving behavior.
- For federal second-degree murder, malice aforethought may be established without intent to kill when the defendant acts with extreme recklessness demonstrating extreme disregard for human life (“depraved heart” conduct).
- Involuntary manslaughter involves a lesser culpable mental state (gross negligence) than the extreme recklessness that supports malice aforethought.
- Sufficiency review asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Issues not raised in the district court are reviewed for plain error on appeal; reversal generally requires a clear error that affected substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings.
- Claims of juror prejudice from courtroom spectator conduct require a record showing actual or likely improper influence; prejudice is not presumed on a minimal record.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Sheffey’s second-degree murder conviction, holding that witness descriptions of his driving as reckless were admissible, the jury was properly instructed that malice can be shown by extreme reckless disregard for human life, and the evidence of alcohol use, excessive sedating medication, and exceptionally dangerous driving sufficed to prove malice; unpreserved recusal and spectator-prejudice claims failed under the limited record and plain-error standards.


United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419 (6th Cir. 1995)