## Facts

- Maceo Simmons, a Jackson, Mississippi police officer, participated in a traffic stop involving 19-year-old Syreeta Robinson and her boyfriend, Towaski Bell.
- Marijuana was found on Robinson; Simmons arrested and handcuffed her and placed her in the back of his patrol car. Bell was arrested and placed in another officer’s patrol car.
- After arriving at the police station, Simmons remained with Robinson in the patrol car and later directed the other officer to follow him.
- Simmons stopped, removed Robinson’s handcuffs, moved her to the front seat, drove to a secluded location, and sexually assaulted her in the patrol car while the other officer acted as a lookout.
- Robinson was later driven home and warned not to disclose the incident; she told others shortly after and sought medical care but delayed reporting to law enforcement due to fear of retaliation.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion under Rule 702 and *Daubert* in admitting expert testimony describing common sexual-assault victim behaviors and whether that testimony improperly suggested the complainant was truthful or that an assault occurred.
2. Whether admission of Simmons’s prior sworn testimony from a state proceeding was improper on constitutional or evidentiary grounds.
3. Whether the district court erred at sentencing by refusing to apply U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3)(A) (victim in the “custody, care, or supervisory control” of the defendant).
4. Whether the imposed 240-month sentence was reasonable under *Booker* and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

## Decision

- The court affirmed the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for sexual assault under color of law involving aggravated sexual abuse.
- The court held the expert testimony was admissible: the district court acted within its *Daubert* gatekeeping discretion, the testimony was based on specialized knowledge about victim behavior, and the expert did not opine that a rape occurred.
- The court held Simmons’s prior state-trial testimony was properly admitted because it was sworn, given with counsel, and voluntarily offered, permitting its use as the defendant’s own prior statements.
- The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the victim was in Simmons’s custody or supervisory control when assaulted, requiring the § 2A3.1(b)(3)(A) enhancement.
- The remand directed resentencing using the corrected advisory guideline range and consideration of § 3553(a) under *Booker*.

## Legal Principles

- Trial courts have broad discretion in assessing expert reliability and fit under Rule 702 and *Daubert*/*Kumho*; behavioral testimony about typical sexual-assault victim responses may be admissible if it assists the jury and does not directly state that the assault occurred or that the victim is truthful.
- An expert’s general testimony about victim behavior, coupled with limiting instructions and an express disclaimer of opining on the ultimate historical fact, can avoid improper intrusion on the jury’s credibility function.
- A defendant’s prior sworn testimony from another proceeding, voluntarily given with the assistance of counsel, may be introduced against the defendant in a later criminal trial without violating the Fifth Amendment.
- U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3)(A) applies when the victim is in the defendant’s custody, care, or supervisory control; an arrestee who is handcuffed, transported, and controlled by an officer falls within the enhancement’s scope.
- A guidelines calculation error that affects the advisory range requires vacatur and resentencing consistent with *Booker* and the § 3553(a) factors.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit upheld Simmons’s § 242 conviction, finding no reversible error in the admission of expert testimony on victim behavior or the use of Simmons’s prior sworn testimony, but vacated and remanded for resentencing because the district court erroneously отказed to apply the custody/supervisory-control enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3)(A) and needed to resentence under the corrected advisory range and § 3553(a).


United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115 (5th Cir. 2006)