## Facts

- Steven M. Skoien had two prior convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence (2003 and 2006).
- Wisconsin authorities informed him that federal law barred him from possessing firearms; he signed an acknowledgment.
- While on probation for the second conviction, he was found possessing three firearms, including a shotgun.
- He entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawfully possessing the shotgun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), preserving a Second Amendment challenge to the statute.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which bars firearm possession by persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, violates the Second Amendment.
2. If the Second Amendment applies, what level of scrutiny governs review of § 922(g)(9) and whether the statute satisfies that standard.

## Decision

- The en banc Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and upheld § 922(g)(9) as constitutional.
- The court assumed, without definitively deciding, that the statute burdens conduct within the Second Amendment’s scope and proceeded to apply heightened scrutiny.
- The court applied intermediate scrutiny, requiring a substantial relation (reasonable fit) between the law and an important governmental objective.
- The court held the government met its burden: disarming domestic-violence misdemeanants is substantially related to reducing domestic gun violence.
- The court rejected arguments that the statute was invalid because it targets misdemeanants, was enacted in 1996 rather than being “longstanding,” or operates as a permanent ban.

## Legal Principles

- The Second Amendment permits some categorical firearm restrictions; not all gun regulations require strict scrutiny, and rational-basis review is insufficient for burdens within the Amendment’s scope.
- Intermediate scrutiny may apply to firearm restrictions on particular groups when the government shows a substantial relation between the restriction and an important governmental objective.
- Preventing domestic gun violence is an important governmental interest, and legislatures may rely on empirical evidence and congressional findings linking domestic-violence convictions with heightened risk of future violence.
- Legislatures may employ categorical disqualifications rather than case-by-case dangerousness determinations, even if the rule is imperfectly tailored, so long as the fit is substantial under intermediate scrutiny.
- The constitutionality of a firearm regulation does not turn solely on whether it is “longstanding”; the controlling inquiry is the strength of the means–end relationship under the applicable scrutiny.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit (en banc) held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not violate the Second Amendment because, under intermediate scrutiny, the government showed a substantial relationship between disarming domestic-violence misdemeanants and reducing domestic gun violence, and it affirmed Skoien’s conviction.


United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)