## Facts

- Michael Arlan Sprick worked as a financial advisor and obtained control over substantial funds from three elderly widow clients: Maurita Johnson (about $1.09 million), Corrine Parker (about $800,000), and Annie Hallford (about $70,000).
- The clients entrusted the funds for investment and management for their benefit; the government alleged Sprick instead misappropriated client funds for personal use, including a luxury residence in Odessa, Texas.
- The prosecution charged bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), and money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956), based on a scheme to defraud clients, use of the mails to execute the scheme, and financial transactions involving proceeds.
- After learning he was under investigation, Sprick drafted an email to a radio personality stating he stole a large amount of money from clients and was guilty; due to an incorrect address, the email was never sent.
- The unsent email was found on Sprick’s computer and admitted at trial; the jury was instructed to consider it only as to the bank-fraud charges, not as to later-added mail-fraud or money-laundering charges.
- The jury convicted Sprick of six mail-fraud counts and six related money-laundering counts, plus one bank-fraud count and one related money-laundering count; it acquitted him on five other bank-fraud counts.
- At sentencing, the district court adopted a finding that the total amount laundered exceeded $1,000,000 for Guidelines purposes.

## Issues

1. Whether admitting the unsent “confession” email was an abuse of discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
2. Whether evidence was sufficient to sustain the single conviction for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) and the money-laundering count predicated on that bank-fraud conviction.
3. Whether evidence was sufficient to sustain the six mail-fraud convictions and the six related money-laundering convictions.
4. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding the laundered amount exceeded $1,000,000 for sentencing.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed admission of the unsent email, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403, particularly given the limiting instruction.
- The court affirmed the six mail-fraud convictions and the six money-laundering convictions tied to those mail-fraud counts.
- The court reversed the single bank-fraud conviction under § 1344(2) for insufficient evidence and reversed the single money-laundering conviction dependent on that bank-fraud count.
- The court affirmed the district court’s sentencing finding that the laundered amount exceeded $1,000,000, finding no clear error.
- Disposition: affirmed in part and reversed in part.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 403 decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion; relevant evidence may be excluded only if unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, and limiting instructions can reduce risk of unfair prejudice.
- Sufficiency of the evidence is assessed by viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict and asking whether a rational jury could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 requires a scheme to defraud and use of the mails for the purpose of executing the scheme.
- Bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) requires proof of obtaining bank-owned or bank-controlled property “by means of” false or fraudulent pretenses; proof of client-directed fraud alone may be insufficient for that charged theory.
- A money-laundering conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 requires a qualifying predicate offense and a transaction involving its proceeds with the requisite intent; if the predicate conviction fails, a dependent laundering count may also fail.
- Sentencing findings on amount laundered are reviewed for clear error; the district court may rely on supported presentence calculations.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit upheld Sprick’s mail-fraud and related money-laundering convictions and found no reversible error in admitting an unsent confession-like email with a limiting instruction or in finding more than $1,000,000 laundered, but reversed a § 1344(2) bank-fraud conviction and the laundering count predicated on it for lack of sufficient proof that the charged bank-fraud theory was met.


United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 2000)