## Facts

- Lance Corporal Milton D. Steele, U.S. Marine Corps, was tried by a general court-martial with a military judge sitting alone.
- Steele was convicted, pursuant to mixed pleas, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and wrongful distribution of cocaine under Articles 81 and 112a, UCMJ.
- Steele was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, eight years’ confinement, total forfeitures, and reduction to E-1; the convening authority approved the sentence.
- Steele was represented at trial by detailed military defense counsel and a civilian defense counsel.
- The military judge advised Steele of his right to counsel, and Steele elected representation by both counsel.
- The civilian defense counsel stated he was licensed by the highest courts of Iowa, Hawaii, and Texas and had previously been qualified, certified, and sworn for court-martial practice.
- Steele did not challenge counsel’s qualifications or effectiveness at trial, in post-trial proceedings, or before the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals.
- In his petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), Steele asserted that his civilian counsel was in inactive status in each admitting jurisdiction at the time of trial and therefore was allegedly unauthorized to practice, violating the Sixth Amendment.

## Issues

1. Whether representation by civilian counsel who was in inactive status in all jurisdictions of admission constituted a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
2. Whether a civilian attorney in inactive or retired bar status is “authorized to practice” before a general court-martial under Articles 27 and 38(b)(2), UCMJ, and R.C.M. 502.

## Decision

- CAAF affirmed the lower court’s decision and left the convictions and sentence intact.
- CAAF rejected a per se Sixth Amendment rule based solely on an attorney’s inactive bar classification.
- CAAF held that inactive or retired bar status, without disciplinary suspension/disbarment or a showing of deficient performance and prejudice, did not establish constitutional ineffective assistance.
- CAAF held that civilian counsel may be authorized to appear at court-martial if the counsel satisfies statutory and regulatory requirements tied to bar membership and military qualification procedures, notwithstanding inactive bar status.

## Legal Principles

- Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claims generally require proof of deficient performance and resulting prejudice; administrative “inactive” bar status alone does not establish a constitutional violation.
- For court-martial practice, the relevant statutory focus is on membership in a qualifying bar and compliance with military qualification/certification processes, not on state administrative labels where the attorney remains a bar member in good standing.
- A per se denial-of-counsel theory is not triggered merely because counsel is not on active status in state bars; it is more closely associated with situations involving nonlawyers or attorneys barred from practice by discipline.
- An accused’s contemporaneous acceptance of counsel and the absence of timely objection may support treating the alleged defect as non-structural and subject to case-specific analysis.

## Conclusion

CAAF held that a civilian defense counsel’s inactive bar status did not, by itself, disqualify counsel from appearing before a general court-martial or amount to a Sixth Amendment denial of counsel, and it affirmed Steele’s convictions and sentence absent a showing of deficient performance and prejudice or disciplinary ineligibility.


United States v. Steele, 53 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2000)