## Facts

- Andrew True Stever lived with his mother on a 400-acre rural property in Oregon.
- Officers executed a search warrant on July 7, 2007 and found a large marijuana cultivation site in an isolated corner of the property near adjoining Forest Service land.
- More than 7,000 marijuana plants were discovered, mostly on the Stever property; additional plants and camouflaged equipment (including tents and a disassembled greenhouse) were found on Forest Service land.
- Two men described as Hispanic fled; officers recovered clothing, two firearms, a cell phone, and a wallet.
- The wallet contained a resident alien card for Alfredo Jesus Beltran-Pulido, as well as Stever’s business card and Stever’s mother’s cell phone number.
- Phone records showed Stever frequently called numbers stored in the cell phone found at the scene.
- Stever admitted hiring Pulido and other Hispanic workers in May to work on a generator and repair fences; Pulido lived for a time in a trailer on the property and also camped nearby.
- Stever’s defense theory was that a Mexican drug trafficking organization (DTO) operated the grow—often using private land without the owner’s knowledge—and that he was not involved.
- Stever sought discovery about Mexican DTO activity in eastern Oregon to support this alternative-perpetrator theory; the district court denied the request as not material under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
- The district court also granted a government motion in limine excluding all evidence and argument relating to Mexican DTOs as irrelevant and speculative.
- A jury convicted Stever of conspiracy to manufacture 1,000 or more marijuana plants and manufacture of marijuana.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E)(i) by denying discovery of DTO-related materials as not material to preparing the defense.
2. Whether restricting access to DTO-related materials and excluding all DTO evidence and argument violated Stever’s constitutional right to present a complete defense.
3. Whether any nondisclosure of favorable DTO-related information constituted a Brady violation.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded.
- The court held the district court abused its discretion under Rule 16 by denying DTO-related discovery despite a sufficient threshold showing of materiality.
- The court held that the combined effect of denying discovery and categorically excluding DTO evidence prevented meaningful presentation of Stever’s central defense theory, violating the constitutional right to present a defense.
- The court concluded the errors were not harmless given the circumstantial nature of the government’s case and the potential impact of alternative-perpetrator evidence on reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- Under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i), a defendant is entitled to discovery of items within the government’s possession, custody, or control that are material to preparing the defense.
- Materiality requires a threshold factual showing that the government likely possesses information helpful to the defense; targeted requests supporting a coherent defense theory are not barred as mere “fishing expeditions.”
- Discovery obligations can extend to information held by other agencies when the prosecution has knowledge of and access to the requested materials.
- The Constitution guarantees a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, including the ability to present evidence of third-party guilt or an alternative perpetrator that has a legitimate tendency to cast doubt on guilt.
- Courts may apply ordinary relevance and prejudice limits, but categorical exclusion of an adequately supported defense theory—especially when paired with discovery restrictions—can violate due process and the Sixth Amendment.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit reversed because Stever made a sufficient showing that DTO-related materials were material to his alternative-perpetrator defense, yet the district court denied discovery and then barred all DTO evidence and argument, effectively preventing him from presenting his theory of innocence to the jury.


United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 2010)