## Facts

- Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, convicted of terrorism-related offenses and serving a life sentence, was subject to Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) restricting communications to prevent him from directing terrorist activity from prison.
- Lynne Stewart (Rahman’s attorney) and Mohammed Yousry (translator) obtained access to Rahman by signing written affirmations agreeing to comply with the SAMs, including not passing messages between Rahman and third parties.
- Over roughly 14 months, the government proved that Stewart and Yousry used attorney visits to facilitate non-legal communications between Rahman and outsiders, including matters related to an Egyptian Islamist group’s cease-fire.
- Evidence showed Stewart distracted guards and provided cover while Yousry conveyed messages, and Stewart issued a public statement conveying Rahman’s position on the cease-fire, contrary to the SAMs.
- Ahmed Abdel Sattar, a Rahman follower outside prison, participated in communications and dissemination efforts tied to Rahman’s messaging.
- A jury convicted Stewart of conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. § 371, providing/concealing material support under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2, and false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001; Yousry and Sattar were convicted on overlapping terrorism-related counts.
- The district court imposed below-Guidelines sentences, including 28 months’ imprisonment for Stewart; defendants appealed convictions and sentences, and the government cross-appealed the sentences as too low.

## Issues

1. Whether defendants could challenge the legality or constitutionality of the SAMs as a defense in the criminal prosecution and whether the SAMs could be enforced against counsel and a translator.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove conspiracy to defraud the United States and to provide and conceal material support to a conspiracy to kill and kidnap abroad.
3. Whether applying criminal statutes to attorney/translator conduct during representation violated the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment.
4. Whether the sentences, particularly Stewart’s, were substantively unreasonable given the seriousness of the conduct and the Sentencing Guidelines.

## Decision

- Affirmed the convictions of Stewart, Yousry, and Sattar on all counts challenged.
- Held defendants could not collaterally attack the SAMs’ validity in the criminal case; the appropriate avenue was civil or administrative review, not disobedience.
- Found sufficient evidence that defendants knowingly deceived and obstructed the Bureau of Prisons/DOJ in administering the SAMs, supporting a § 371 “defraud” conspiracy.
- Sustained Stewart’s material-support convictions, holding the facilitated communications and public transmission of Rahman’s message could constitute “material support” to a foreign conspiracy to kill and kidnap under § 2339A.
- Rejected First Amendment and counsel-related defenses because the convictions rested on deceptive conduct and facilitation of prohibited communications, not viewpoint-based punishment or protected legal representation.
- Upheld Stewart’s § 1001 conviction based on materially false affirmations to federal authorities about complying with the SAMs.
- Vacated Stewart’s sentence as substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing; also remanded as to Yousry’s and Sattar’s sentences to permit reconsideration in light of Stewart’s resentencing, while otherwise affirming their sentences.

## Legal Principles

- A § 371 “defraud” conspiracy includes agreements to impair, obstruct, or defeat lawful government functions through deceitful means, including evasion of prison communication restrictions imposed pursuant to lawful authority.
- Parties who accept access conditions through written affirmations may be criminally liable for deceptive noncompliance that obstructs the administration of those restrictions.
- Defendants generally may not defend a criminal prosecution by collaterally attacking the validity of a lawful regulatory regime they allegedly violated; the proper route is direct administrative or civil challenge.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, facilitating communications that further a foreign conspiracy to kill and kidnap can qualify as “material support or resources” when the support is provided to the conspiracy rather than constituting general political advocacy.
- The First Amendment does not protect deceptive conduct or provision of material support to terrorism-related conspiracies merely because it occurs in the setting of attorney representation.
- A § 1001 conviction may rest on knowingly false, material representations to federal agencies in access-related compliance affirmations when subsequent conduct shows the promises were false.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit upheld terrorism-related convictions arising from an attorney’s and a translator’s deliberate evasion of prison SAMs to transmit a high-risk inmate’s messages to outsiders, treating the conduct as fraud on prison administration and material support to a foreign violent conspiracy, while holding Stewart’s below-Guidelines sentence substantively unreasonable and requiring resentencing.


United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009)