## Facts

- Ronnie Lee Stewart and Beacher Drell Roach traveled to Cleveland, Tennessee to check out a bank they later planned to rob.
- On November 28, 1989, Stewart and Roach returned to Cleveland with Rodney Fred Delegal and Benjamin Leavern Wells to commit the robbery, traveling in two vehicles, one intended to be abandoned.
- Stewart, Delegal, and Wells entered the bank disguised and armed while Roach waited outside; they stole money and fled by car.
- During the escape, a dye pack hidden with the money discharged, filling the car with dye and tear gas; the robbers abandoned the vehicle and eventually returned to Georgia.
- After the FBI learned Roach had participated, an agent asked him to secretly audio-record conversations with his accomplices about the robbery; Roach recorded a conversation in which Stewart made statements implicating himself.
- Stewart was arrested and detained. While in jail, he made additional incriminating statements to fellow inmate Roderick Stafford, who later reported those statements to government agents and testified at trial.
- Kentucky officers arrested Delegal on state stolen-vehicle-related matters. In the presence of FBI Agent Dan Brennan, Delegal was advised of his Miranda rights at arrest.
- Delegal was later indicted in Kentucky on state charges. After Brennan learned Delegal was a suspect in the Tennessee bank robbery, Brennan re-advised Delegal of his Miranda rights on separate occasions, obtained a signed advice-of-rights form, and questioned him; Delegal confessed to participating in the robbery. No third-party witness was present, and the statement was not recorded.
- Stewart and Delegal were indicted in federal court for conspiracy, bank robbery, and using a dangerous weapon in relation to a crime of violence.
- Delegal moved to suppress his confession; the district court denied the motion. At trial, the recording, the jailhouse testimony, and Delegal’s confession were admitted, and the jury convicted both defendants.
- At sentencing, the district court departed upward in Stewart’s criminal history category based on prior consolidated sentences, and sentenced Delegal as a career offender; both appealed.

## Issues

1. Did admitting Delegal’s confession to FBI Agent Brennan violate the Sixth Amendment because Delegal had been indicted and had counsel appointed on separate Kentucky state charges?
2. Did admitting Stafford’s testimony about Stewart’s jailhouse statements violate the Sixth Amendment because Stafford allegedly acted as a government agent who deliberately elicited incriminating statements?
3. Was a portion of Roach’s surreptitious recording referencing a “dye bomb” improperly admitted as prior-bad-act evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403?
4. Did an FBI agent’s testimony that Wells was not a “career criminal” unfairly prejudice Stewart by implying Stewart was a career criminal?
5. Were the defendants’ Guidelines sentences erroneous, including (a) the upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 for Stewart and (b) Delegal’s constitutional challenges to the career-offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1?

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences in all respects.
- The court held Delegal’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached to the federal bank-robbery offense at the time of Brennan’s questioning, and in any event Delegal knowingly and intelligently waived his rights after receiving Miranda warnings; the confession was properly admitted.
- The court held Stafford was not shown to have acted in concert with law enforcement to extract statements; Stafford was, at most, a passive listener, so admitting his testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
- The court found no reversible evidentiary error in admitting the “dye bomb” portion of the Roach recording; it was probative of Stewart’s participation in the charged robbery and not impermissible propensity evidence.
- The court rejected Stewart’s claim of prejudice from the “career criminal” remark as too remote to warrant reversal.
- The court upheld Stewart’s upward departure under § 4A1.3 as authorized and reasonable and rejected Delegal’s constitutional attacks on § 4B1.1.

## Legal Principles

- The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings begin for a specific offense and is offense-specific; representation or indictment on one charge does not automatically bar questioning about a different, uncharged offense.
- Post-indictment questioning is not categorically barred; a defendant may waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Miranda warnings and a signed waiver can support a knowing and intelligent waiver.
- A jailhouse informant violates the Sixth Amendment only when, acting with law enforcement, the informant takes steps designed to deliberately elicit incriminating statements; merely listening and later reporting statements is not enough.
- Evidence closely tied to proving the charged offense is generally admissible notwithstanding Rule 404(b) objections, and Rule 403 exclusion requires unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs probative value.
- An upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 may be appropriate when a defendant’s criminal history category understates the seriousness of past conduct, including where prior serious crimes were handled through consolidated sentencing.
- The career-offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, Double Jeopardy, the Eighth Amendment, or Equal Protection on the theories raised in this appeal.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stewart’s and Delegal’s federal bank-robbery-related convictions and Guidelines sentences, holding that Delegal’s confession was admissible because his Sixth Amendment right had not yet attached to the federal offense and he validly waived his rights after Miranda warnings, that Stafford did not deliberately elicit Stewart’s jailhouse admissions as a government agent, that the challenged recording and testimony did not warrant reversal under Rules 403 or 404(b), and that the upward departure and career-offender sentencing determinations were lawful.


United States v. Stewart & Delegal, 951 F.2d 351 (1991)