## Facts

- Glen Sutherland was a municipal court judge in El Paso, Texas.
- The government alleged two ticket-disposition schemes involving Sutherland and separate intermediaries.
- From about 1975 to 1977, Grace Walker allegedly collected traffic tickets and related payments from Sutherland’s associates, charged an added premium per ticket, delivered the tickets to Sutherland for favorable disposition, and split proceeds with him.
- In 1979, Edward Maynard allegedly ran a similar arrangement: he collected tickets and money, presented them to Sutherland for favorable handling, and shared proceeds with him.
- The alleged RICO “enterprise” was the Municipal Court of the City of El Paso.
- The indictment charged all three defendants in a single count with conspiracy to violate RICO by conducting or participating in the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity based on bribery-like ticket fixing.
- At trial, the government did not present evidence that Walker and Maynard met, communicated, or otherwise directly agreed with each other.
- A jury convicted Sutherland, Walker, and Maynard on the single RICO conspiracy count; the district court denied post-trial relief.

## Issues

1. Whether a single RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) may be proved where participants made separate agreements with a common participant involving the same enterprise, without proof of a direct agreement or connection between all co-conspirators.
2. Whether any variance between the indictment’s allegation of one overarching conspiracy and proof suggesting two distinct schemes required reversal due to prejudice.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support each defendant’s conviction for the charged RICO conspiracy.
4. Whether the indictment adequately alleged place/venue for bribery-based predicate acts by stating they occurred in the Western District of Texas.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Sutherland, Walker, and Maynard.
- The court held that the government was not required to prove a direct agreement or personal connection between Walker and Maynard to establish a single § 1962(d) RICO conspiracy.
- The court concluded that, even if the proof suggested separable arrangements, any variance from the single-conspiracy charge did not prejudice substantial rights.
- The court found the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that each defendant knowingly agreed to participate in conducting the municipal court enterprise’s affairs through ticket-fixing acts.
- The court held the indictment’s allegation that relevant acts occurred in the Western District of Texas sufficiently stated place for federal pleading purposes.

## Legal Principles

- A RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) may be established by proof that defendants agreed to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the same RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; the government need not show that every conspirator directly agreed with or knew every other conspirator.
- Where an indictment charges a single conspiracy but the proof shows separate, related agreements, reversal for variance is warranted only if the variance affects substantial rights, such as by causing spillover prejudice or impairing the defense.
- Evidence is sufficient if, viewing the record as a whole, a rational jury could find knowing agreement to further the enterprise through the charged racketeering pattern.
- For federal indictment pleading, alleging that the offense occurred within the prosecuting federal district generally suffices to allege place/venue unless greater specificity is required by the offense.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit upheld RICO conspiracy convictions arising from ticket-fixing through a municipal court, holding that separate agreements tied to the same enterprise can support a single § 1962(d) conspiracy without proof that all conspirators directly connected, and finding no prejudicial variance, sufficient evidence, and adequate venue pleading.


United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981)