## Facts

- Ralph Kelly Taylor II drove a car from Canada into the United States accompanied by MacDonald.
- Customs officers found counterfeit Federal Reserve notes concealed in the vehicle.
- Taylor denied knowing the notes were counterfeit and denied any intent to defraud.
- The government relied largely on circumstantial evidence, including the concealment and the circumstances of the border crossing, to show knowing possession and intent to defraud.
- A jury in the Northern District of New York convicted Taylor of possessing and concealing counterfeit obligations with intent to defraud.

## Issues

1. What standard should a federal trial judge apply when deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to submit a criminal case to the jury or deny a motion for acquittal: the same threshold as in civil cases, or a standard keyed to proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
2. Whether a conviction must be reversed because the indictment described counterfeit “Treasury notes” while the proof showed counterfeit “Federal Reserve notes.”
3. Whether the trial court may instruct on aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 when the indictment does not expressly cite § 2.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the conviction.
- The court overruled its prior “single test” approach equating the judge’s submission-to-the-jury threshold in civil and criminal cases, and adopted a standard that reflects the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden.
- Under the corrected standard, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor knowingly possessed and concealed counterfeit notes with intent to defraud.
- The “Treasury notes” versus “Federal Reserve notes” discrepancy was a nonprejudicial variance that affected no substantial rights.
- An aiding-and-abetting instruction was permissible despite the indictment’s failure to cite 18 U.S.C. § 2, so long as the evidence supported that theory.

## Legal Principles

- In ruling on sufficiency in a criminal case, the judge must account for the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the case may go to the jury only if the evidence permits a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in the government’s favor.
- A variance between indictment and proof warrants reversal only if it prejudices substantial rights, such as by causing unfair surprise, impairing trial preparation, or undermining double-jeopardy protection.
- Aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 need not be specifically pleaded in the indictment for the jury to be instructed on that theory, provided the evidence supports it and the instruction does not broaden the charged offense.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed Taylor’s counterfeit-currency conviction, revised its sufficiency-of-the-evidence submission standard to reflect the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden, and held that neither a nonprejudicial misdescription of the notes in the indictment nor an aiding-and-abetting instruction absent an explicit § 2 citation required reversal.


United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972)