## Facts

- Dewey Taylor owned a liquor store in Buffalo, New York, and the business generated significant cash receipts.
- Taylor was also a member of the Afro Dogs Motorcycle Club in Buffalo; federal agents investigated other members for cocaine distribution.
- A federal grand jury charged Taylor with (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and (2) multiple counts of structuring cash transactions to evade financial-institution reporting requirements.
- As to the drug count, the indictment alleged a conspiracy involving five kilograms or more of cocaine.
- At trial, the government introduced testimony and other evidence tying Taylor to the cocaine operation, including evidence that Taylor delivered cocaine at another conspirator’s request and helped count large amounts of cash proceeds.
- As to structuring, the government relied mainly on Taylor’s transaction records at Erie Metro Federal Credit Union, where Taylor made deposits into personal and business accounts over about a 20-month period.
- The structuring charges presented to the jury were based on seven “split” cash deposit events: on each charged day, Taylor made two cash deposits, presented to a single teller at one branch, that together exceeded $10,000 even though each individual deposit was $10,000 or less.
- The same account history also showed Taylor frequently made single cash deposits exceeding $10,000, which would be reportable.
- The government dismissed several structuring counts before the case went to the jury; the jury convicted Taylor of the cocaine-conspiracy count and of seven structuring counts.
- On the drug count, the jury found the conspiracy involved 500 grams or more of cocaine (a lesser quantity than alleged in the indictment).

## Issues

1. Whether Taylor’s drug-conspiracy conviction rested on an impermissible constructive amendment (or prejudicial variance) because the indictment charged a conspiracy involving five kilograms or more of cocaine, but the jury convicted based on a finding of 500 grams or more.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor structured the charged cash deposits “for the purpose of evading” currency-transaction reporting requirements, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5324.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed Taylor’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute cocaine.
- The court held there was no constructive amendment (and no reversible variance) where the jury found a smaller drug quantity than the indictment alleged for the same charged conspiracy.
- The Second Circuit reversed Taylor’s seven structuring convictions, holding the evidence was insufficient to show Taylor acted with the purpose of evading currency-reporting requirements.
- The court remanded for resentencing in light of the reversal of the structuring counts.

## Legal Principles

- A constructive amendment occurs when trial proof and jury instructions alter the indictment’s terms so that there is a substantial likelihood the defendant was convicted of an offense different from the one charged.
- In a drug-conspiracy prosecution under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, allowing the jury to determine a lesser drug quantity than the quantity charged does not necessarily constructively amend the indictment when the conviction remains for the same conspiracy offense and the quantity finding affects the applicable penalty range.
- To convict for structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 5324, the government must prove the defendant acted with the purpose of evading a financial institution’s currency-transaction reporting duty; evidence of transactions near the $10,000 threshold, without proof of evasive purpose, is not enough.
- In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict but must reverse if no rational juror could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- A record showing frequent, open deposits exceeding $10,000, combined with “split deposits” handed to a single teller at one time, can defeat an inference that the defendant intended to prevent reporting, absent additional evidence of knowledge of and purpose to avoid the reporting rules.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that Taylor’s cocaine-conspiracy conviction stood because the jury’s finding of a lesser drug quantity did not change the charged offense, but it reversed the structuring convictions because the government’s proof—seven split deposits given to one teller amid many openly reportable deposits—did not permit a rational jury to find an intent to evade currency-transaction reporting requirements, and the case was remanded for resentencing.


United States v. Taylor, 816 F.3d 12 (2016)