## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged two attorneys at a Queens County, New York law firm, alleging the firm functioned as a RICO “enterprise” that defrauded insurance companies through automobile-accident claims.
- The alleged racketeering activity consisted of 29 predicate acts: 28 acts of mail fraud and 1 act of obstruction of justice.
- The government’s theory was that the firm used repetitive mailings to submit inflated or false insurance claims, including claims supported by exaggerated or false medical reports.
- After a jury trial in the Eastern District of New York, Jay Teitler was convicted of RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) and one count of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341).
- Marc G. Schultz was convicted of RICO conspiracy, a substantive RICO violation (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)), and two counts of mail fraud.
- During deliberations, the jury asked whether it could convict Teitler of RICO conspiracy even if it convicted him of only one mail-fraud count; the trial court instructed that it could, so long as the jury found an agreement to commit at least two predicate acts.
- Both defendants appealed, challenging the meaning of “pattern” under RICO and the application of conspiracy principles to § 1962(d).

## Issues

1. Whether the charged and proved racketeering activity—primarily multiple related mail-fraud acts tied to an ongoing insurance-claim scheme—satisfied RICO’s “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement.
2. Whether a defendant may be convicted of RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) based on an agreement to commit at least two predicate acts even if the jury convicts the defendant of fewer substantive predicate offenses.
3. Whether common-law conspiracy limitations restrict § 1962(d) (including any requirement that conspirators personally commit predicate acts or that conspiracy liability track completed substantive offenses).
4. Whether the challenged jury instructions and related trial rulings required reversal.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of both defendants.
- The court held that the government’s proof supported a “pattern of racketeering activity” where multiple mail-fraud predicates were related and carried out as part of a repetitive, ongoing scheme.
- The court upheld the RICO conspiracy convictions, concluding that § 1962(d) focuses on the agreement to pursue the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
- The court rejected the argument that a RICO conspiracy conviction is invalid merely because the jury convicted on only a subset of charged predicate acts.
- The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions or in the defendants’ other challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and trial conduct.

## Legal Principles

- A RICO “pattern of racketeering activity” may be established by multiple related predicate acts (including repeated mail fraud) committed in furtherance of an ongoing fraudulent scheme, where the acts are connected and indicate the threat of continued criminal conduct.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), RICO conspiracy liability turns on proof of an agreement that the enterprise’s affairs will be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity; conviction does not require that the defendant be convicted of each charged predicate act.
- A jury may convict a defendant of RICO conspiracy if it finds an agreement encompassing at least two racketeering predicates, even if it returns guilty verdicts on fewer substantive predicate counts.
- Common-law conspiracy concepts do not override the statutory elements of § 1962(d); the government need not prove that each conspirator personally committed two predicate acts if the conspirator agreed that the enterprise would be run through the requisite racketeering conduct.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed RICO and mail-fraud convictions arising from a law firm’s alleged insurance-claims scheme, holding that repeated related mail-fraud acts can satisfy RICO’s pattern requirement and that a § 1962(d) conspiracy conviction may rest on an agreement to commit at least two predicate acts even when the defendant is convicted of fewer substantive predicates.


United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986)