## Facts

- Paul R. Thielemann used AOL email and online chats to transmit child pornography and to solicit child sexual abuse for his sexual gratification.
- On January 19, 2007, Thielemann transmitted child pornography via AOL email; AOL reported the activity to law enforcement.
- Police obtained and executed a search warrant on February 23, 2007, seizing Thielemann’s computer.
- The computer contained several hundred child-pornographic images and chat logs with Christopher Phillips, an adult associate.
- Chat transcripts showed Thielemann encouraged Phillips to sexually abuse an eight-year-old child under Phillips’s control and offered to “walk” him through the conduct.
- Thielemann offered Phillips money to use a webcam to expose the child to Thielemann’s genitals; Phillips complied.
- Thielemann then offered more money for Phillips to rub the child’s genitals and lift her skirt; the transcript indicated Phillips complied.
- Thielemann was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court improperly treated Thielemann’s uncharged inducement of Phillips’s sexual abuse of a child as “relevant conduct” when sentencing for receipt of child pornography.
2. Whether a special condition substantially restricting computer and internet use during supervised release satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
3. Whether a special condition prohibiting possession or viewing of “sexually explicit material,” defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A), violated the First Amendment or exceeded permissible supervised-release limits.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment and sentence.
- The district court permissibly considered the uncharged conduct as relevant conduct in selecting a 240-month (statutory maximum) sentence.
- The computer/internet restriction was reasonably related to sentencing purposes and did not impose a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary under § 3583(d).
- The ban on sexually explicit material, defined by reference to § 2256(2)(A), was sufficiently definite and constitutional as applied to a person on supervised release.

## Legal Principles

- At sentencing, a court may consider uncharged conduct supported by the record if it is part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.
- Special conditions of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) must be reasonably related to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, impose no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
- Significant restrictions on computer and internet access may be upheld when those tools were central to the offense conduct and the restriction serves deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation.
- Content-based restrictions during supervised release may be permissible when clearly defined, tied to the defendant’s offense and risk of recidivism, and justified under § 3583(d), even if they would raise stronger First Amendment concerns for the general public.
- Incorporating a statutory definition (such as 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)) can provide adequate notice and reduce vagueness concerns for supervised-release conditions.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld Thielemann’s statutory-maximum sentence for receiving child pornography, holding that his online inducement of child sexual abuse qualified as relevant conduct, and it affirmed supervised-release conditions that sharply limited internet access and prohibited sexually explicit material as reasonably necessary to deter recidivism, protect the public, and aid rehabilitation.


United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2009)