## Facts

- William James Thigpen, a convicted felon, bought three semi-automatic pistols after making false statements about his criminal history.
- He was indicted on six counts for the false statements and for unlawful possession of the pistols as a felon.
- Insanity was his only defense; two psychiatrists testified he suffered from schizophrenia, consistent with other psychiatric diagnoses in the record.
- On cross-examination of a defense psychiatrist, the prosecutor asked whether, if Thigpen took medication, he would be “okay to go out in the world amongst society,” referring to being “released from the hospital” and “on society”; defense counsel did not object to that line of questioning.
- The prosecutor also elicited expert testimony, over objection, about the general relationship between schizophrenia and a person’s ability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of conduct.
- Thigpen requested a jury instruction explaining that a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) verdict would trigger federal commitment procedures under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA); the district court refused and instructed jurors not to consider consequences of the verdict.
- Thigpen was convicted and later committed under federal law; he appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant asserting an insanity defense under the IDRA is entitled, as of right, to a jury instruction describing the post-verdict commitment procedures and consequences of an NGRI verdict.
2. Whether the prosecutor’s “release into society” questioning required a commitment-consequences instruction, and whether the failure to give one (without a contemporaneous objection) was reversible plain error.
3. Whether expert testimony describing how schizophrenia generally affects cognition and appreciation of wrongfulness violates Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by stating an ultimate-issue opinion.

## Decision

- The en banc Eleventh Circuit held there is no general entitlement to an instruction explaining the consequences of an NGRI verdict under the IDRA.
- The court limited such instructions to circumstances where inadmissible evidence or improper argument creates a specific, erroneous impression about post-verdict consequences that requires correction.
- Applying plain-error review, the court held the prosecutor’s “on society” questions did not create an obvious, outcome-determinative false impression requiring a curative instruction.
- The court held the challenged expert testimony was admissible because it addressed general effects of schizophrenia and did not opine directly on Thigpen’s mental state at the time of the offenses.
- Thigpen’s conviction was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- In federal criminal trials, juries generally should not be instructed on punishment or post-verdict disposition; their role is to determine guilt or innocence based on the evidence and governing law.
- The IDRA’s commitment scheme for NGRI acquittees does not create a statutory right to a jury instruction explaining those consequences.
- A commitment-consequences instruction may be warranted only as a curative measure when the jury has been affirmatively misled by improper argument or inadmissible evidence about what an insanity verdict would mean.
- Under plain-error review, the absence of a curative instruction is not reversible unless the error is clear and affects substantial rights and the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
- Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars experts from stating whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense or defense, but permits testimony about the general or typical effects of a mental disease, so long as it does not directly state the defendant’s ultimate legal mental-state conclusion.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Thigpen’s conviction, ruling that IDRA defendants are not automatically entitled to jury instructions on post-NGRI commitment and that generalized expert testimony about schizophrenia’s effects is permissible under Rule 704(b) when it avoids an explicit opinion on the defendant’s ultimate mental state at the time of the crime.


United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc)