## Facts

- Todd A. Tittel, a U.S. Navy specialist third class, previously was convicted at a general court-martial (including shoplifting) and processed for administrative separation with a recommendation for a general discharge.
- One day before the planned discharge execution, Tittel was caught shoplifting from a Navy Exchange in Yokosuka, Japan, stealing 44 items worth about $366.
- Captain William D. Lynch, commanding officer at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, ordered Tittel not to enter any Navy Exchange facility.
- Tittel later entered a Navy Exchange in violation of that order.
- At a special court-martial, pursuant to pleas, Tittel was convicted of willful disobedience of a superior officer (Article 90, UCMJ) and larceny (Article 121, UCMJ).
- The sentence included confinement, forfeitures, reduction to E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge.
- Captain Lynch served as convening authority and approved the sentence.
- On appeal, the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions but reduced confinement to comply with a pretrial agreement.

## Issues

1. Whether the convening authority became an “accuser” by being the officer whose order was disobeyed, disqualifying him from convening the special court-martial under R.C.M. 504(c)(1).
2. Whether any convening-authority disqualification error was nonjurisdictional and waived because it was not raised at trial under R.C.M. 904(e).
3. Whether any assumed error materially prejudiced the accused’s substantial rights under Article 59(a), UCMJ.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the lower court’s decision.
- The court found no record evidence that Captain Lynch was personally involved with the accused to the extent necessary to make him a disqualifying “accuser.”
- Even assuming Captain Lynch should have been treated as an accuser, any failure to forward the charges to a higher authority was a nonjurisdictional error that was waived by the lack of a timely objection at trial.
- The court held there was no material prejudice because a competent authority would have been likely to refer serious charges to a special court-martial regardless.

## Legal Principles

- A convening authority must be neutral, but being the officer whose order was disobeyed does not automatically establish disqualifying “accuser” status; the record must show personal involvement or a personal interest beyond official responsibilities.
- An “accuser” is disqualified from convening a special court-martial under R.C.M. 504(c)(1).
- Claims of convening-authority disqualification may be nonjurisdictional and subject to waiver when not raised at trial under R.C.M. 904(e).
- Appellate relief requires a showing of material prejudice to substantial rights under Article 59(a), UCMJ; speculative harm is insufficient where referral and disposition would likely have been the same.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the convictions and sentence (as modified for the pretrial agreement), ruling that the convening authority was not shown to be a disqualifying accuser and that any assumed defect was waived and, in any event, nonprejudicial under Article 59(a).


United States v. Tittel, 53 M.J. 313 (C.A.A.F. 2000)