## Facts

- Jerome Eugene Todd operated a prostitution enterprise in the Seattle area involving adult women, including Kelsey Kirschman, Whitney T., Whitney E., and Jemelle L.
- Todd recruited women into prostitution, arranged or directed advertising (including online and print ads), and required the women to surrender earnings to him.
- Todd imposed strict rules over the women’s daily activities and maintained compliance through threats, physical assaults, and intimidation; associates, including his cousin Trent, helped supervise and enforce rules.
- Evidence included repeated beatings of Kelsey, threats of physical enforcement toward other women, and conduct (including shoving and threats) that caused victims to fear leaving or disobeying Todd.
- A federal grand jury charged Todd with three counts of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)), one count of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), and one Mann Act count (18 U.S.C. § 2421).
- A jury convicted Todd on all counts; the district court denied motions for acquittal and imposed substantial concurrent sentences on the trafficking counts and additional concurrent terms on the conspiracy and Mann Act counts.
- On appeal, Todd challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on the trafficking and conspiracy counts and disputed the role of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) in defining offenses versus setting penalties.

## Issues

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported that Todd acted “knowing that force, fraud, or coercion ... will be used” to cause the victims to engage in commercial sex acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) creates a separate offense or instead prescribes penalties for the offense defined in § 1591(a).
3. Whether sufficient evidence supported Todd’s conviction for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 371.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed Todd’s convictions and the challenged aspects of his sentence.
- The court held the evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Todd knew force, fraud, or coercion would be used as part of his sex-trafficking operation.
- The court held § 1591(b) is a penalty provision for the § 1591(a) offense, not a separate substantive crime.
- The court upheld the § 371 conspiracy conviction based on evidence of an agreement, Todd’s participation, and overt acts furthering the trafficking venture.

## Legal Principles

- Under § 1591(a)(1), the knowledge element (“knowing that ... force, fraud, or coercion ... will be used”) may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including an established, ongoing method of controlling victims through threats and violence.
- The government need not prove the defendant had a temporally specific or detailed plan for future uses of force; a continuing coercive system supporting commercial sex can support the inference that coercion “will be used.”
- In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, the court asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational juror could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Section 1591(b) functions as a penalty subsection tied to § 1591(a), setting sentencing ranges based on specified aggravating facts rather than defining an additional, freestanding trafficking offense.
- A § 371 conspiracy conviction requires proof of an agreement to commit the underlying offense, knowing participation, and at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; coordinated recruitment, supervision, advertising, and enforcement activities can satisfy these elements.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit sustained Todd’s trafficking and conspiracy convictions by treating the TVPA’s knowledge requirement as satisfied where the defendant’s operation repeatedly used threats and violence to compel compliance, and it construed § 1591(b) as a penalty provision that does not create a separate offense.


United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010)