## Facts

- Frank Tot was prosecuted under the Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 902(f), which made it unlawful for a person previously convicted of a “crime of violence” to receive a firearm or ammunition that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
- Tot’s prior conviction qualifying as a “crime of violence” under the Act was not disputed on appeal.
- Federal officers went to Tot’s home in Newark, New Jersey and arrested him pursuant to a valid arrest warrant charging theft of cigarettes from an interstate shipment.
- During the arrest at Tot’s residence, officers discovered and seized a .32 caliber Colt automatic pistol.
- Tot filed motions seeking suppression of the pistol and related evidence and sought return of the gun, arguing the seizure resulted from an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
- The district court denied Tot’s suppression/return motions, and Tot was convicted under § 902(f).
- Tot appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, challenging the search-and-seizure ruling and the constitutionality and operation of § 902(f), including arguments tied to the Second Amendment and the statute’s requirements linking receipt to interstate commerce.

## Issues

1. Whether the seizure of the pistol from Tot’s residence during execution of a valid arrest warrant was an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment requiring suppression and return of the weapon.
2. Whether 15 U.S.C. § 902(f), barring persons convicted of a “crime of violence” from receiving firearms that have moved in interstate or foreign commerce, violated the Second Amendment (and related constitutional limits) as applied to Tot.
3. Whether the government’s proof satisfied the statute’s elements, including “receipt” of a firearm that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed Tot’s conviction and sentence.
- The court held that the pistol’s seizure during the arrest at Tot’s home was reasonable as a search incident to a lawful arrest and therefore did not require suppression under the Fourth Amendment.
- The court rejected Tot’s constitutional challenges to § 902(f) and upheld Congress’s authority to regulate the receipt of firearms moving in interstate commerce and to restrict receipt by persons with prior convictions for violent crimes.
- The court concluded the statutory elements—including the prior “crime of violence” status and the interstate-commerce-related receipt requirement—were adequately supported to sustain the conviction.

## Legal Principles

- The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures; the validity of a challenged search depends on whether, in context, the officers’ actions were reasonable.
- A lawful arrest permits a contemporaneous search of the arrestee and the area where the arrest is made for weapons and for items connected with the arrest or needed to prevent escape; a weapon found in that setting may be seized and admitted if the search stays within that allowed scope.
- Congress may regulate the receipt of firearms that have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, including restricting receipt by persons previously convicted of crimes of violence, without the Second Amendment operating as an absolute bar to such commerce-based regulation.
- To convict under 15 U.S.C. § 902(f), the government must prove (1) a qualifying prior conviction, and (2) receipt of a firearm or ammunition that has moved in interstate or foreign commerce; evidentiary rules and inferences used to establish those elements must remain consistent with constitutional limits.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed Tot’s conviction under the Federal Firearms Act, holding that the pistol seized at Tot’s home during a lawful arrest was taken in a reasonable search incident to arrest and that § 902(f)’s restriction on receipt of firearms shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by persons previously convicted of violent crimes was constitutionally valid as applied, with the evidence sufficient to support the statutory elements.


United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (1942)