## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Michael Steven Twombly and a co-defendant with criminal violations of the CAN-SPAM Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(3)–(4), based on alleged fraudulent practices tied to unsolicited commercial email.
- The indictment alleged the defendants conspired to lease computer servers using false identities and contact information.
- Twombly allegedly leased about 20 servers under false names, provided log-on credentials to the co-defendant, and received payment for each set of credentials.
- Using the leased servers, the defendants allegedly sent millions of unsolicited commercial emails advertising software and directing recipients to a website run through a sham Canadian software company.
- The emails allegedly contained materially falsified routing and header information, including misleading “From” lines.
- A server provider allegedly suffered business harm after anti-spam services blacklisted its network domain, impairing email communications.
- The indictment largely tracked the language of § 1037(a)(3)–(4) and did not separately plead a generalized mens rea beyond what was expressed in the statutory terms.

## Issues

1. Whether an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(3)–(4) is sufficient when it tracks the statutory language but does not separately allege a generalized “criminal intent” mens rea.
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(3)–(4) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause for failing to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and permitting arbitrary enforcement.

## Decision

- The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment.
- The court held the indictment was sufficient because it alleged the offense elements by tracking § 1037(a)(3)–(4) and included adequate factual detail to inform the defendants of the charges and permit a double-jeopardy bar.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, holding the CAN-SPAM provisions at issue provided fair notice and sufficiently clear standards for enforcement.

## Legal Principles

- A federal indictment is sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the charged offense and fairly informs the defendant of the charge, and (2) enables the defendant to plead a conviction or acquittal as a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense.
- An indictment generally satisfies federal pleading requirements when it tracks the statutory language and provides enough factual specificity to identify the charged conduct.
- When the statute’s text supplies the relevant mental-state component, an indictment need not add an extra, generalized allegation of “criminal intent” beyond the statutory terms.
- A criminal statute is void for vagueness only if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited or allows arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
- The CAN-SPAM Act’s criminal provisions targeting knowing, fraudulent practices—such as procuring servers through false identification and materially falsifying email header or routing information—provide constitutionally adequate notice when applied to alleged deliberate falsification in mass commercial emailing.

## Conclusion

The district court permitted the prosecution to proceed, ruling that the CAN-SPAM Act indictment adequately alleged the offenses by tracking § 1037(a)(3)–(4) and that the challenged provisions were not unconstitutionally vague because they gave fair notice and clear enforcement standards for the alleged fraudulent spam scheme.


United States v. Twombly, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (S.D. Cal. 2007)