## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Lawrence R. Plamondon, John Sinclair, and John Forrest with offenses arising from the 1968 bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- During the investigation, federal officials conducted electronic surveillance (wiretapping) of at least one defendant and others without first obtaining a judicial warrant.
- The government acknowledged the surveillance but asserted it was undertaken for “domestic security” purposes, approved by the Attorney General as part of the President’s responsibility to protect national security.
- The defendants moved in the district court for discovery and an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prosecution’s evidence was tainted by the warrantless surveillance, and sought disclosure of the surveillance materials.
- The government opposed disclosure and defended the surveillance as lawful under the Executive’s domestic security authority, relying in part on 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (a provision in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
- The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge Damon J. Keith) ordered the government to produce the surveillance materials; the order effectively barred use of the surveillance-derived evidence absent compliance.
- The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the United States sought Supreme Court review.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless electronic surveillance conducted within the United States for “domestic security” purposes, based solely on executive authorization.
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) provided statutory authorization for warrantless domestic security wiretaps.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts in a unanimous decision (Rehnquist, J., did not participate).
- The Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires prior judicial approval for electronic surveillance undertaken for domestic security purposes; the Attorney General’s authorization is not a substitute for a neutral magistrate.
- The Court concluded that § 2511(3) did not create an affirmative statutory exception authorizing warrantless domestic security surveillance; it functioned as a disclaimer that Title III did not define the scope of presidential security powers.
- The Court expressly did not decide the standards or legality for warrantless surveillance involving foreign powers or their agents, limiting its holding to domestic security surveillance directed at domestic organizations and activities.

## Legal Principles

- The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies to domestic security electronic surveillance; absent a warrant, such monitoring is generally unreasonable.
- Executive claims of domestic security do not eliminate the need for prior judicial review; the warrant process supplies the independent judgment of a “neutral and detached” magistrate.
- The domestic security label is too elastic to serve as a self-executing trigger for warrantless surveillance, given the risk of monitoring political dissent and lawful association.
- Even when secrecy and speed are important, those interests can be addressed through warrant procedures tailored to security investigations rather than by removing judicial supervision entirely.
- Title III’s § 2511(3) does not itself authorize warrantless domestic surveillance; Congress must speak clearly if it intends to create any limited exception to ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements.
- The Court left room for Congress to design a warrant procedure responsive to domestic security needs, but insisted that some form of prior judicial authorization is constitutionally required in the domestic setting addressed.

## Conclusion

United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich. (the “Keith” case) held that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a judicial warrant before conducting electronic surveillance for domestic security purposes within the United States. The Court rejected the argument that the Attorney General’s approval or § 2511(3) authorized warrantless domestic wiretaps, emphasizing that judicial oversight is necessary to prevent executive overreach and to protect privacy and associational freedoms, while leaving unresolved questions concerning surveillance aimed at foreign powers or their agents.


United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972)