## Facts

- After a vehicle collision in Cumberland Gap National Historic Park, U.S. Park Rangers investigated Darwin E. Veach and suspected intoxication based on sobriety testing and a breath test.
- While being secured for transport, Veach physically struggled with Ranger Greg Mullin, attempting to pull away and pulling Mullin down to one knee, causing an abrasion.
- During transport and later at a hospital, Veach made repeated graphic threats against Rangers Mullin and Karen Bradford, including statements that he would kill them and decapitate them.
- A jury convicted Veach of resisting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and two counts of threatening federal officers with intent to impede official duties under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).
- The district court barred Veach from presenting a diminished-capacity/voluntary intoxication defense as to all charges and limited cross-examination of Mullin about his perception of the threats.
- At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender guideline enhancement, treating Veach’s prior Kentucky fourth-offense DUI as a “crime of violence,” and imposed an effective 80-month sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) is a general-intent offense, making voluntary intoxication inadmissible to negate mens rea.
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) is a specific-intent offense, requiring admission of voluntary intoxication evidence offered to negate the statute’s intent element.
3. Whether limiting cross-examination of the threatened officer about his subjective perception of the threats improperly restricted relevant evidence bearing on whether the statements were “true threats.”
4. Whether a Kentucky fourth-offense DUI conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” for career-offender purposes under the Sentencing Guidelines.

## Decision

- Affirmed the § 111(a)(1) conviction, holding § 111 is a general-intent statute and voluntary intoxication is not a defense.
- Reversed the § 115(a)(1)(B) convictions and remanded for a new trial because § 115 is a specific-intent offense and the district court improperly excluded intoxication/diminished-capacity evidence relevant to intent.
- Addressed the cross-examination issue for guidance on remand, indicating the restriction on questioning Mullin about his perception of the threats was likely too limiting and should be reconsidered.
- Affirmed the career-offender determination, holding felony fourth-offense DUI qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’ residual-clause analysis applied by the court.

## Legal Principles

- Voluntary intoxication may negate the mens rea for specific-intent crimes but does not negate mens rea for general-intent crimes.
- 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) requires proof of forcible resistance or interference with a federal officer in the performance of duties, without proof of an additional ulterior purpose; it is a general-intent offense.
- 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) requires proof that the defendant made a threat and did so “with intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate” against a federal officer; it is a specific-intent offense.
- When a statute requires a specific intent, evidence of intoxication may be admissible if it tends to show the defendant could not form that required intent.
- In threat prosecutions, contextual evidence bearing on whether statements constitute serious expressions of intent to harm is relevant; the recipient’s perception may be probative and can support cross-examination.
- A felony DUI offense may qualify as a “crime of violence” for career-offender purposes where it involves conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit held that resisting a federal officer under § 111 is a general-intent offense for which voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but threatening federal officers under § 115 is a specific-intent offense requiring that the defendant be permitted to offer intoxication evidence to contest intent; it therefore affirmed the § 111 conviction and career-offender ruling but reversed and remanded the § 115 convictions for a new trial with broader consideration of relevant intent and threat-related evidence.


United States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2006)