## Facts

- The United States shipped 211 Army loads described as steel aerial bomb cases filled with napalm gel, lacking a burster and fuse and therefore incomplete as finished incendiary weapons.
- Rail carriers billed the shipments at a higher first-class rate under a tariff item for “incendiary bombs.”
- After audit, the United States paid (or set off) charges using a lower rate, treating the goods as akin to gasoline shipped in steel drums.
- The railroads sued in the Court of Claims to recover the difference between the higher “incendiary bombs” rate and the lower rate paid by the United States.
- The Court of Claims granted summary judgment for the railroads, rejected the government’s request to refer tariff questions to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and rejected the government’s estoppel defense.

## Issues

1. Whether tariff construction and the reasonableness of the tariff as applied were within the ICC’s exclusive primary jurisdiction, requiring referral before judicial resolution.
2. Whether referral to the ICC in a pending court case was barred by the two-year limitations period in § 16(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act when the tariff issues were raised defensively.
3. Whether summary judgment was proper against the government’s estoppel defense to two carriers’ claims for the higher rate.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
- The Court held that both tariff construction (the meaning of “incendiary bombs”) and reasonableness of the rate as applied had to be determined first by the ICC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
- The Court held that § 16(3)’s two-year limit did not bar ICC referral when the tariff issues were raised as defenses rather than as an affirmative complaint for reparations.
- The Court held that the Court of Claims improperly disposed of the government’s estoppel defense by summary judgment because material factual questions remained.

## Legal Principles

- Under primary jurisdiction, courts with jurisdiction should suspend adjudication and refer issues placed within an agency’s special competence to that agency for initial determination.
- Tariff interpretation may require agency referral when it turns on transportation facts, classifications, cost allocation, hazards, and regulatory policy beyond ordinary judicial experience.
- When tariff meaning and rate reasonableness are closely connected and depend on the same factual and policy considerations, the agency must address both in the first instance.
- Statutory limits on filing agency “complaints” do not prevent a court from referring agency-competence questions arising defensively in a timely judicial action.
- Summary judgment is improper where an estoppel defense depends on disputed facts concerning representations, reliance, and reasonableness.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court required initial ICC determination of the tariff’s meaning and the rate’s reasonableness as applied to the shipments, ruled that defensive referral was not time-barred by § 16(3), and ordered further proceedings because the government’s estoppel defense could not be resolved without factual development.


United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956)