## Facts

- Virginia Nell Walser and her husband were tried for crop-insurance fraud based on alleged underreporting of insured soybean production and related crop-loss claims; both were acquitted.
- In the first trial, Walser’s defense asserted that disputed soybeans were an uninsured crop from a different farm, not covered by the relevant insurance program.
- Walser called an FCIC claims specialist, Richmond Morrow, who produced file documents under subpoena and testified under oath; two defense exhibits were admitted through him:
  - A letter from Walser to Morrow stating she was sending a copy of an SCI-013 “Statement of Facts” purportedly attached to her 1986 acreage report.
  - The SCI-013 form itself, which supported Walser’s claim that the soybeans were uninsured and outside coverage.
- After the acquittal, a government investigation determined the SCI-013 version used at trial could not have existed on the date shown because the printing company did not print and deliver that specific form until about a week later.
- Walser was later indicted for (i) perjury and aiding and abetting, premised on intentionally causing Morrow to introduce false documentary evidence under oath at the first trial, and (ii) making false statements to a federal agency, including submitting altered seed invoices and other falsified records in connection with disaster-relief claims.
- A jury convicted Walser on all counts, and she received a prison term and supervised release.
- On appeal, Walser challenged the use of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) to support a perjury conviction where she did not testify, the denial of severance, and the sufficiency of the evidence.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant who was not under oath may be convicted as a principal for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 by willfully causing an unwitting witness to present false material evidence under oath, under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
2. Whether the district court erred by trying the perjury-related counts and the false-statement counts together rather than severing them.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the perjury-related convictions and the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 false-statement convictions.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence.
- The court held that § 2(b) permits perjury liability as a principal under § 1623 when the defendant willfully causes an innocent intermediary to present false material evidence under oath.
- The court held joinder was proper under Rule 8(a) because the offenses were of similar character and related to obtaining federal crop-related benefits, and severance was not warranted absent compelling prejudice under Rule 14.
- The court found the evidence sufficient for all counts, including proof supporting an inference that Walser created or used a back-dated SCI-013 form and knowingly submitted falsified documents to federal agencies.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), a person who willfully causes another to commit a criminal act is punishable as a principal, even if the intermediary lacks criminal intent.
- Section 2(b) may apply to perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 where the defendant intentionally causes false material declarations or evidence to be presented under oath in federal court proceedings.
- Offenses may be joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) when they are of the same or similar character or connected by a common scheme; severance under Rule 14 requires a showing of compelling prejudice not cured by limiting instructions.
- Sufficiency review asks whether, viewing the evidence in the government’s favor, a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Walser’s perjury-related convictions on the ground that a defendant may be liable as a principal under § 1623 through § 2(b) by intentionally causing an unwitting witness to introduce false evidence under oath, and it also upheld joinder and the jury’s verdicts based on sufficient proof of intentional falsification and false statements to federal agencies.


United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380 (11th Cir. 1993)