## Facts

- The federal government prosecuted Daniel William for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1708 by stealing mail and unlawfully possessing stolen mail.
- A sender deposited a letter in a mailbox for postal pickup and delivery, and the letter was properly addressed.
- William took the letter shortly after it was placed in the mailbox.
- The addressee never received the letter, and the letter was later found in William’s possession.
- At trial, William admitted taking the letter but testified that he intended to return it to the mailbox before the scheduled pickup time.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that, to convict, the government had to prove William intended to deprive the owner of the letter’s benefit, either temporarily or permanently.
- Over William’s objection, the judge also instructed the jury that it could infer William stole the letter if it found the letter was properly addressed, recently mailed, never received by the addressee, and found in William’s possession.
- The jury found William guilty, and William appealed, challenging the permissive-inference instruction.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that it could infer William stole the letter from findings that the letter was properly addressed, recently mailed, never received, and found in William’s possession.
2. Whether that inference instruction improperly relieved the government of proving the intent element required by 18 U.S.C. § 1708 beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed William’s conviction.
- The court treated the challenged instruction as a permissive inference rather than a mandatory presumption.
- The court accepted the government’s position that the inference instruction addressed the identity of the person who took the letter, not the separate requirement that the government prove intent to deprive.
- Considering the jury instructions as a whole, the court concluded the jury was still required to find every element of the offense, including intent to deprive (either temporarily or permanently), beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court rejected the argument that the instruction directed a verdict or shifted the burden of proof to the defense on intent.

## Legal Principles

- A permissive inference instruction is generally permissible when it allows, but does not require, the jury to draw an inference from proved facts and does not remove the government’s burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- In a mail-theft prosecution, circumstantial proof that mail was properly addressed, recently mailed, not received by the addressee, and later found in a defendant’s possession can support an inference that the defendant was the person who took the mail.
- Courts evaluate challenged instructions in context; an instruction is less likely to be reversible error when the charge, read as a whole, makes clear that the government bears the burden of proof on all elements, including intent.

## Conclusion

In *United States v. William*, 491 Fed. Appx. 821 (2012), the Ninth Circuit affirmed Daniel William’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1708, holding that the district court’s instruction permitting an inference of theft from nonreceipt plus possession was permissive and aimed at identifying the taker, and that the instructions as a whole still required the government to prove intent to deprive (temporarily or permanently) beyond a reasonable doubt.


United States v. William, 491 Fed. Appx. 821 (2012)