## Facts

- Kwai Fun Wong, an immigrant detainee, alleged torts by federal immigration officers and pursued relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
- Wong timely filed an administrative FTCA claim with the Immigration and Naturalization Service within two years of accrual.
- The agency denied the claim on December 3, 2001, starting the six-month period to file an FTCA suit in federal court.
- Wong had a pending federal civil action and moved (after the six-month period) to amend that complaint to add an FTCA claim; the district court allowed the amendment but dismissed the FTCA claim as untimely.
- In the companion case, Marlene June filed an FTCA claim late at the administrative presentment stage and argued the delay should be excused because the government concealed key facts; the district court dismissed as time-barred.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed in both cases, holding that § 2401(b)’s deadlines can be equitably tolled.
- The Supreme Court granted review and decided the cases together.

## Issues

1. Whether the FTCA deadlines in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) are jurisdictional limits on courts’ adjudicatory power or nonjurisdictional statutes of limitations.
2. Whether courts may apply equitable tolling to § 2401(b)’s two-year administrative presentment period and six-month period to file suit after agency denial.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that § 2401(b)’s time limits are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling.
- Applying a presumption that limitations periods in suits against the United States are tollable absent a clear congressional statement to the contrary, the Court found no clear statement making § 2401(b) jurisdictional.
- The Court relied on statutory text: § 2401(b) addresses timeliness (“shall be forever barred”) without speaking to district court jurisdiction or authority.
- The Court relied on structure: the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), while § 2401(b) is a separate filing-deadline provision, which weighs against a jurisdictional reading.
- The Court rejected the argument that “shall be forever barred” is inherently jurisdictional, treating it as common limitations language historically used in nonjurisdictional statutes.
- The Court rejected a sovereign-immunity argument that would treat the deadlines as absolute conditions on the waiver, explaining that the presumption favoring tolling applies in suits against the Government.
- The Court remanded for lower courts to determine whether equitable tolling was warranted on the specific facts of Wong’s and June’s cases.

## Legal Principles

- A statutory time bar is treated as jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states that it limits the court’s adjudicatory authority.
- Under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)’s two-year administrative presentment deadline and six-month post-denial filing deadline are claims-processing rules, not jurisdictional limits.
- Courts retain authority to equitably toll § 2401(b) where a plaintiff diligently pursued rights but extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing.
- The phrase “shall be forever barred,” without jurisdictional language or linkage to the jurisdictional grant, does not by itself make a limitations period jurisdictional.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the FTCA’s timing requirements in § 2401(b) do not limit federal courts’ jurisdiction and may be equitably tolled, leaving application of tolling to be decided on remand based on the litigants’ circumstances.


United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015)