## Facts

- The United States prosecuted Keith Steven Young and Edelmiro Tamez, Jr. for participating in a cocaine distribution operation in Washington’s Tri-Cities area.
- The government’s case relied heavily on cooperating witnesses, including John Drake, who testified that Young and Tamez supplied him with kilogram quantities of cocaine for redistribution.
- Multiple government witnesses testified pursuant to plea agreements or immunity; the principal prosecution witnesses received immunity or other favorable treatment in exchange for testimony.
- After the government rested, the defense sought to call David Delfs to impeach Drake. Delfs indicated he would invoke the Fifth Amendment unless granted use immunity because he faced an unrelated federal firearms case.
- The defense proffered that Delfs would testify Drake said he was “falsely accusing somebody as being [his] supplier in the Tri-Cities,” which the defendants claimed referred to them.
- The government refused to immunize Delfs. The district court denied the defense request to compel immunity and denied a request for an evidentiary hearing into the immunity decision.
- On appeal, the government argued Delfs’s proposed testimony was inadmissible impeachment because Drake had not been confronted with the alleged prior inconsistent statement.

## Issues

1. Whether due process required an evidentiary hearing on whether the government’s selective use of immunity—immunizing prosecution witnesses while refusing to immunize a defense witness—intentionally distorted the fact-finding process.
2. Whether the district court could deny a hearing based on the government’s claim that the defense witness’s proffered impeachment testimony would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
- The court held the defense made a sufficient showing that Delfs’s proffered testimony was relevant and materially beneficial, warranting inquiry into whether the government’s refusal to immunize intentionally distorted the fact-finding process.
- The court rejected resolving the immunity question solely by accepting the government’s asserted evidentiary inadmissibility rationale, and required factual development of the government’s reasons for withholding immunity.

## Legal Principles

- Prosecutorial decisions about immunity are generally discretionary, but due process imposes limits when selective immunity threatens to distort the truth-seeking function of trial.
- A due process violation may occur where the government grants immunity or comparable benefits to its witnesses while refusing immunity to an essential, exculpatory defense witness in a manner intended to distort fact-finding.
- When the defense makes a prima facie showing that the testimony is relevant and materially helpful and that selective immunity may have distorted the trial, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to examine the government’s motives and justification.
- Evidentiary objections to the form of proposed impeachment do not, by themselves, eliminate the need for a hearing when the defense plausibly shows the testimony could materially affect the jury’s assessment of a key government witness.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit required a remand for an evidentiary hearing because the defendants plausibly showed that the government’s refusal to immunize a defense witness with impeachment evidence, against a backdrop of immunized or incentivized prosecution testimony, might have intentionally distorted the fact-finding process in violation of due process.


United States v. Young, 86 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1996)