## Facts

- Yudong Zhu, a medical professor and MRI researcher, worked at a university and used an NIH grant for research activity.
- Under the grant arrangement and university policies, the university owned the grant funds and equipment purchased with those funds, including a laptop issued to Zhu.
- During a university investigation into suspected misuse of grant funds, Zhu surrendered the university-owned laptop but refused to provide its passwords.
- University officials provided the laptop to the FBI, and university counsel authorized the FBI to search it.
- The FBI searched the laptop without a warrant and obtained evidence later used in criminal charges.
- The court previously denied Zhu’s motion to suppress, holding the warrantless search was valid based on third-party consent because the university had common authority over the laptop.
- After the Supreme Court decided Riley v. California (2014), Zhu moved for reconsideration under Local Rule 6.3, arguing Riley was an intervening change in controlling law requiring suppression.

## Issues

1. Whether Riley v. California constituted an intervening change in controlling law requiring reconsideration of a prior order upholding a warrantless laptop search based on third-party consent.
2. Whether a warrantless search of an employer-owned laptop, authorized by the employer as owner with common authority, is undermined by Riley’s warrant requirement for cell-phone searches incident to arrest.

## Decision

- The court denied Zhu’s motion for reconsideration.
- Riley was not controlling because it addressed the search-incident-to-arrest exception, not third-party consent.
- The prior ruling upholding the search based on the university’s consent remained in effect.

## Legal Principles

- Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy and is generally limited to: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) new evidence, or (3) correcting clear error or preventing manifest injustice.
- A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to relitigate arguments previously decided.
- Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is permissible when a third party with common authority or a sufficient relationship to the property voluntarily consents.
- Riley’s warrant requirement for digital searches is tied to the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine and does not, without more, displace other recognized warrant exceptions such as third-party consent.

## Conclusion

The court held that Riley did not change the controlling law governing third-party consent searches and therefore did not justify reconsideration of the earlier order denying suppression of evidence from the warrantless search of a university-owned laptop authorized by the university.


United States v. Zhu, 41 F. Supp. 3d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)