## Facts

- Major motion picture studios distributed films on DVDs protected by the Content Scramble System (CSS), an encryption-based access control.
- Defendants operated websites (including 2600.com and dvd-copy.com) and posted, hosted, or facilitated access to DeCSS, a program created by reverse engineering that decrypts CSS.
- DeCSS enabled users to bypass CSS and decrypt DVD content, making copying and redistribution feasible.
- The studios sued under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1201, alleging unlawful trafficking in circumvention technology.
- The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring dissemination of DeCSS during litigation.
- After a bench trial, the court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from posting DeCSS and, in relevant circumstances, from linking to sites that distributed it.

## Issues

1. Whether CSS is a technological measure that “effectively controls access” to copyrighted works and whether DeCSS “circumvents” that measure under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
2. Whether posting DeCSS, and providing hyperlinks intended to facilitate obtaining it, constitutes “trafficking” in circumvention technology under § 1201(a)(2).
3. Whether § 1201(a)(2) and the resulting injunction violate the First Amendment when applied to computer code and hyperlinks.
4. Whether fair use principles or DMCA statutory exceptions (including reverse engineering and encryption research) shield defendants’ distribution of DeCSS.

## Decision

- The court held that CSS effectively controls access to the studios’ copyrighted DVD content and that DeCSS is a circumvention technology within § 1201.
- The court found defendants liable for violating § 1201(a)(2) by posting DeCSS and facilitating its dissemination.
- The court concluded that, where hyperlinks were used with knowledge and intent to disseminate DeCSS, linking could be part of the trafficking prohibited by § 1201(a)(2).
- The court rejected defenses based on fair use and held defendants did not establish applicability of statutory exceptions.
- The court held § 1201(a)(2), as applied, was a content-neutral regulation aimed at trafficking in circumvention tools and did not violate the First Amendment.
- The court found irreparable harm from Internet dissemination of DeCSS and entered a permanent injunction barring trafficking in DeCSS and similar CSS-circumventing technology.

## Legal Principles

- A technological measure “effectively controls access” when it requires application of authorized information (such as keys) to obtain access to a copyrighted work; distributing tools designed to defeat that access control can violate § 1201(a)(2).
- Liability under § 1201(a)(2) does not require proof of actual or likely copyright infringement; the statute regulates unauthorized access circumvention and trafficking in circumvention tools.
- Computer code may have expressive content, but the government may regulate distribution of code as a functional circumvention tool through content-neutral rules subject to intermediate scrutiny.
- Hyperlinks can constitute actionable trafficking conduct when used knowingly and intentionally as part of a scheme to disseminate circumvention technology.
- The DMCA’s access-control regime does not guarantee a user’s ability to effectuate every noninfringing use through circumvention; limits on practical access to fair use do not, without more, render § 1201(a)(2) unconstitutional.
- Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where widespread dissemination of circumvention tools threatens loss of effective access control and monetary damages are inadequate.

## Conclusion

The court held that distributing DeCSS and intentionally linking to sources of DeCSS constituted prohibited trafficking in circumvention technology under DMCA § 1201(a)(2), rejected fair use and statutory-exception defenses, upheld the statute against First Amendment challenge as applied, and permanently enjoined further dissemination of DeCSS and similar CSS-circumventing tools.


Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)