## Facts

- C. P. Craft wrote Mrs. Iva Rippstein a letter stating he would send her $200 in cash the first week of each month for five years, and also specified payments for September through December 1960.
- In a marginal handwritten note, Craft stated he struck the phrase “provided I live that long” and “bind[s] my estate” to make the $200 monthly payments described in the letter.
- Craft died shortly after writing the letter.
- Rippstein unsuccessfully attempted to treat the letter as a testamentary instrument in probate proceedings.
- Rippstein then sued the independent executors of Craft’s estate seeking (1) matured installments and (2) a declaration that the estate must pay future installments as they came due.

## Issues

1. Whether Craft’s letter and marginal notation constituted a sufficiently definite present declaration of trust imposing trust duties on identifiable property for Rippstein’s benefit.
2. Whether the writing was instead only a gratuitous promise to make future gifts, unenforceable against the estate.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for the executors.
- The Court held the writing did not create a trust and amounted only to an unenforceable promise to make a gift.
- Because no trust (and no enforceable contract) was established, the estate had no legal obligation to make the promised monthly payments.

## Legal Principles

- A promise to make a gift in the future is not a declaration of trust.
- Creation of a trust requires a clear intent to create present trust obligations, a definite beneficiary, and trust property identified with reasonable certainty.
- Language stating that an “estate” is “bound” to make payments, without an identified trust res or manifested intent to hold property in a fiduciary capacity, does not establish a voluntary trust.
- A purely donative promise unsupported by consideration is not enforceable as a contract.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that Craft’s letter reflected donative intent and an attempted post-death obligation, but it lacked the definite trust intent and identifiable trust property required to create a trust; therefore, the executors were not required to make the monthly payments.


Unthank v. Rippstein, 386 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1964)