## Facts

- AIC Security Investigation, Ltd. provided commercial security services in the Chicago area and operated within a corporate structure that included AIC International Ltd. and related divisions.
- Charles Wessel was hired in February 1986 to run AIC’s security-guard division as Executive Director, the highest management position in that division, with responsibility for overall management and profitability.
- Wessel’s duties included managing and directing a workforce of roughly 300 employees, dealing with labor unions, supervising investigations, tracking litigation, overseeing discipline and policy development, and setting price rates.
- When Wessel began working at AIC, he had emphysema and had also been rated disabled by the Veterans Administration for a prior back injury.
- After starting work, Wessel was diagnosed with lung cancer and took a leave of absence for surgery and recovery; he later experienced a recurrence that required another leave.
- After returning again, Wessel was diagnosed with multiple tumors and was told his condition was terminal. He continued working while receiving palliative treatment.
- Because some treatments were scheduled in the afternoon, Wessel sometimes left work early. The parties disputed how much time Wessel missed and whether his absences affected his ability to perform the job.
- Wessel’s doctors advised him not to drive. He continued driving and refused AIC’s offer to provide a driver; AIC later argued driving was an essential function and created safety concerns.
- AIC management met with Wessel and urged him to retire. When he refused, AIC terminated him without prior written warnings regarding attendance or performance.
- The EEOC sued under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Wessel intervened, seeking relief that included damages authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

## Issues

1. Whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the ADA discriminatory-discharge claim, including whether Wessel was a “qualified individual with a disability” able to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.
2. Whether AIC established, as a matter of law, that “regular and predictable attendance” (and related schedule demands) was an essential function that Wessel could not meet because of cancer treatment.
3. Whether AIC established, as a matter of law, that alleged short-term memory problems or driving-related concerns meant Wessel could not perform essential functions or posed a safety risk that justified termination.
4. Whether summary judgment was appropriate as to the liability of the related corporate entity and individual defendant(s) based on the record concerning employer status and control.

## Decision

- The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
- The court held that the record contained genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Wessel could perform the essential functions of the Executive Director position with or without reasonable accommodation.
- The court concluded that disputes over the extent, impact, and job significance of Wessel’s absences prevented judgment as a matter of law on AIC’s attendance-based defense.
- The court found that the evidence concerning alleged memory limitations and driving/safety concerns did not eliminate fact questions for trial.
- The court also declined to grant summary judgment on the basis of which defendants qualified as an ADA “employer,” because the record left fact questions about the relationship among the entities and the role of the individual defendant.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is improper when the evidentiary record supports competing inferences on material facts; the court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
- Under the ADA, a plaintiff must show they are a “qualified individual with a disability,” meaning they can perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.
- Whether a task is an “essential function” is typically fact-dependent and may turn on the job’s actual demands and how the work is performed in practice.
- An employer’s stated reasons for discharge (such as attendance, performance, or safety) do not warrant summary judgment where the record permits a reasonable factfinder to reject those reasons or find disability-related motivation.
- Questions concerning which entities or persons meet the ADA’s definition of “employer” may require fact development when ownership, control, and operational relationships are disputed or unclear on the summary-judgment record.

## Conclusion

The court refused to end the case at summary judgment because the evidence, viewed favorably to the EEOC and Wessel, left triable disputes about whether Wessel could perform the executive job’s essential functions while undergoing cancer treatment, whether attendance, memory, and driving concerns truly made him unqualified, and whether the defendants identified as AIC and its related owners/operators could be held liable under the ADA and available remedies.


U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security Investigations, 820 F. Supp. 1060 (1993)