## Facts

- Hayden P. Cook insured a 1998 Volkswagen Jetta under an automobile policy issued by USAA County Mutual Insurance Company (USAA).
- Cook declined collision coverage but paid a separate premium for “other than collision” coverage, which included vandalism.
- While traveling, Cook parked his Jetta in a tight parking lot behind a large SUV.
- When Cook returned, the SUV was gone and the Jetta had been pushed backward about 15 feet even though the parking brake remained set.
- The Jetta showed front-end damage (damaged grill, hood bent upward) and a black mark high on the bumper consistent with contact from a taller vehicle.
- Cook reported a claim asserting vandalism; USAA’s estimator priced repairs at about $2,126.56.
- USAA denied the claim, characterizing the loss as a collision (a coverage Cook did not purchase).
- Cook sued for breach of contract, common-law bad faith, statutory violations under the Texas Insurance Code (including prompt-payment provisions), and attorney’s fees.
- A jury found the loss resulted from vandalism, USAA breached contractual and extra-contractual duties, USAA was not excused by Cook’s conduct, and Cook was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
- The trial court entered judgment on the verdict; USAA appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Cook’s testimony that an SUV “collided” with his vehicle constituted a binding judicial admission requiring judgment for USAA on the ground the loss was an uncovered collision.
2. Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the loss was vandalism under the “other than collision” coverage.
3. Whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence and submitting vandalism as a theory of recovery.
4. Whether the evidence supported extra-contractual liability and attorney’s fees once coverage was disputed.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Cook.
- Cook’s testimony did not amount to a clear, deliberate, and unequivocal judicial admission that the policy’s collision category applied as a matter of law.
- The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the damage resulted from vandalism covered under “other than collision” coverage.
- The trial court did not reversibly err in allowing the jury to consider vandalism.
- Because coverage and breach were supported, the evidence also supported the jury’s findings on statutory and common-law extra-contractual liability and the award of attorney’s fees.

## Legal Principles

- A judicial admission requires a clear, deliberate, and unequivocal statement that is contrary to a party’s essential position; a witness’s everyday use of “collision” is not necessarily a conclusive admission about coverage characterization under a policy.
- When a policy distinguishes collision from “other than collision” perils and includes vandalism as a covered peril, an intentional, malicious ramming or pushing of a vehicle may be classified as vandalism despite involving physical impact.
- On legal sufficiency review, an appellate court upholds a verdict supported by more than a scintilla of evidence; on factual sufficiency review, the court does not overturn the verdict unless it is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
- Once coverage and contractual breach are supported by the evidence, extra-contractual claims and attorney’s fees may stand if supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a jury determination that intentional damage inflicted through vehicle-to-vehicle impact could constitute covered vandalism under “other than collision” coverage, and it affirmed resulting contractual damages, extra-contractual liability, and attorney’s fees.


USAA Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 241 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007)