## Facts

- A commercial airliner crashed into Boston Harbor shortly after departing Boston on October 4, 1960, leading to more than 150 personal-injury and wrongful-death actions against the airline and other defendants.
- Over 100 related actions were filed in the District of Massachusetts, and more than 45 were filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
- This proceeding concerned 40 wrongful-death actions filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of mostly Pennsylvania decedents.
- Defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the 40 actions to the District of Massachusetts, citing witness location and consolidation with the related Massachusetts litigation.
- Plaintiffs had not qualified under Massachusetts law to sue as personal representatives there, and Pennsylvania wrongful-death law was viewed as more favorable to plaintiffs than Massachusetts law.

## Issues

1. Whether “where it might have been brought” in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) depends only on federal venue/jurisdiction requirements or also on transferee-state rules such as representative capacity and wrongful-death limitations.
2. Whether, after a defendant-initiated § 1404(a) transfer, the transferee court applies the transferor forum’s state law (including choice-of-law rules) or the transferee forum’s law.
3. How Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)’s reference to the law of the state “in which the district court is held” applies after a § 1404(a) transfer.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded.
- “Where it might have been brought” in § 1404(a) is determined by federal venue and jurisdiction provisions, not by the transferee state’s substantive rules on damages or representative capacity.
- When defendants obtain a § 1404(a) transfer from a proper forum, the transfer does not change the governing state substantive law or the transferor court’s choice-of-law rules.
- Rule 17(b) is read consistently with that rule: in this context, representative capacity continues to be determined under the transferor state’s law, even after transfer.

## Legal Principles

- Section 1404(a) authorizes transfer for convenience and justice within the federal system; it does not condition transfer on satisfaction of transferee-state substantive requirements unrelated to federal venue and jurisdiction.
- In diversity cases transferred under § 1404(a) at a defendant’s request, the transferee court must apply the same state law, including choice-of-law rules, that the transferor court would have applied absent transfer.
- Reading § 1404(a) to alter governing law would permit defendants to use transfer to obtain more favorable substantive law, conflicting with Erie-based limits on outcome-determinative manipulation of state law in federal court.
- Rule 17(b)’s representative-capacity directive follows the governing-law rule in this setting; capacity does not shift to the transferee state’s requirements solely because the case is transferred.
- Convenience analysis under § 1404(a) should account for the governing law that will apply after transfer, including evidentiary needs and the relative familiarity of courts with that law.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a defendant-initiated § 1404(a) transfer is a change in federal forum, not a change in applicable state law: the transferee court must apply the transferor state’s substantive law and choice-of-law rules, and representative capacity remains governed by the transferor state rather than the transferee state.


Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)