## Facts

- The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act requires entities spending over $10,000 on “electioneering communications” to file reports with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) identifying certain donors.
- A statutory provision requires disclosure of “all contributors” of $1,000 or more to the spender when the electioneering-communication disbursements are not made from a segregated account.
- The FEC adopted a regulation requiring corporations and labor organizations to disclose only donors who gave $1,000 or more “for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.”
- Representative Christopher Van Hollen, Jr. sued, asserting the regulation unlawfully narrowed disclosure by allowing donors to avoid reporting unless their contributions were earmarked for electioneering communications.
- The district court held the statute unambiguously required disclosure of all qualifying contributors, invalidated the regulation, and ordered broader disclosure.
- The FEC and intervenor-defendants (including nonprofit groups affected by the rule) appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the statutory donor-disclosure language for electioneering communications unambiguously requires disclosure of all contributors over $1,000 to the spender, or is ambiguous as to which donors must be identified.
2. If ambiguous, whether the FEC’s “purpose” limitation is a permissible construction of the statute under Chevron deference.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the FEC regulation.
- The court held the statutory text is ambiguous regarding whether disclosure reaches all contributors or only those whose donations are connected to electioneering communications.
- Applying Chevron step two, the court concluded the FEC’s purpose-based disclosure requirement is reasonable.
- The court rejected reliance on expressio unius as determinative in the statutory context and found it did not overcome the ambiguity or the agency’s discretion.
- The court accepted the FEC’s consideration of First Amendment burdens as a legitimate reason to limit disclosure to donors who knowingly fund electioneering communications.

## Legal Principles

- When a campaign-finance disclosure statute is ambiguous on the scope of required donor identification, an implementing agency may receive Chevron deference for a reasonable interpretation.
- “Contributors” in election-related statutes may reasonably be construed to mean donors whose funds are given for electoral or electioneering purposes, where the statute does not clearly specify otherwise.
- An agency administering disclosure requirements may account for potential burdens on associational and speech rights and may reasonably tailor disclosure to donors more directly tied to the regulated communications.
- Expressio unius is an interpretive aid, not a controlling rule, and does not automatically bar an agency from adopting a purpose-based limitation absent clear statutory direction.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit sustained the FEC’s regulation requiring disclosure only of donors who give $1,000 or more for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications, holding the statute ambiguous on donor scope and the agency’s narrowing construction reasonable under Chevron.


Van Hollen, Jr. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016)