## Facts

- Maetta Vance, an African-American employee in Ball State University Dining Services, alleged she was subjected to racially hostile conduct by Saundra Davis (a catering specialist) and others.
- Vance asserted Ball State University failed to respond adequately to her complaints and that the harassment created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.
- Vance sought to hold the university vicariously liable on the theory that Davis was her “supervisor,” rather than a co-worker.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the university, concluding Davis lacked authority to take tangible employment actions against Vance and thus was not a supervisor under the governing framework.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying a rule limiting “supervisor” status to employees empowered to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline the victim.

## Issues

1. For Title VII hostile-environment claims, who qualifies as a “supervisor” whose harassment may trigger vicarious employer liability under the *Faragher*/*Ellerth* framework?
2. Does “supervisor” include employees who direct and oversee a victim’s daily work, even if they lack authority to take tangible employment actions?
3. If the alleged harasser is not a supervisor, what liability standard governs the employer’s responsibility for workplace harassment?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5–4 decision.
- The Court held that an employee is a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if the employer empowers that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim.
- Because Davis lacked authority to take tangible employment actions affecting Vance’s employment status, she was a co-worker, not a supervisor.
- With the harasser treated as a co-worker, the employer’s liability turned on negligence in controlling working conditions; on the record presented, summary judgment for the university was proper.

## Legal Principles

- Under Title VII, employer liability for workplace harassment depends on the harasser’s status under the *Faragher*/*Ellerth* framework.
- If the harasser is a co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in preventing or correcting harassment.
- If the harasser is a supervisor and the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer is vicariously liable.
- If the harasser is a supervisor but no tangible employment action occurs, the employer may assert an affirmative defense by showing reasonable preventive/corrective care and the employee’s unreasonable failure to use those measures.
- “Supervisor” status for vicarious liability is limited to employees empowered to take tangible employment actions (significant changes in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failure to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or decisions causing significant benefit changes).
- Agency guidance treating authority over daily work direction as sufficient for “supervisor” status is not controlling where it conflicts with the Court’s administrable framework.

## Conclusion

The Court adopted a bright-line definition of “supervisor” for Title VII vicarious liability: only those empowered to take tangible employment actions. Harassment by employees who merely direct day-to-day work is evaluated under a negligence standard, not automatic vicarious liability.


Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013)