## Facts

- Texas officials sought to use state public nuisance statutes to close adult movie theaters and bar future exhibitions of allegedly obscene films.
- Article 4666 authorized injunction suits to abate nuisances and required closure of the premises for one year upon a successful action, subject to statutory conditions.
- Article 4667(a) defined as a public nuisance the commercial manufacturing, distribution, or exhibition of obscene material and directed that such uses be enjoined at the suit of the State or any citizen.
- An adults-only motion-picture theater in Harris County faced threatened injunction proceedings under these statutes based on alleged past exhibitions of obscene films.
- The theater operator filed in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the nuisance scheme functioned as an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression.
- A three-judge district court upheld the statutes facially but construed them to permit injunctions only against future exhibitions of films already adjudicated obscene and declined to allow injunctions based solely on past showings.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding the scheme (as interpreted in state practice) authorized indefinite prior restraints on film exhibition without a final obscenity determination and without prompt review.
- The State appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether a nuisance injunction scheme is unconstitutional when it permits courts, based on past exhibitions of obscene films, to enjoin future exhibitions of films not yet adjudicated obscene.
2. Whether such injunctions can be treated as no more constitutionally problematic than criminal obscenity laws because they address unlawful expression.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment invalidating the statute’s use against motion-picture exhibitors.
- The Court held unconstitutional the statute as construed to permit injunctions restraining future exhibitions of films not yet found obscene.
- The Court rejected the argument that the restraint was comparable to criminal sanctions, noting exhibitors could face contempt for violating preliminary orders even if the film ultimately proved nonobscene.
- The Court accepted that the scheme lacked required procedural protections, including safeguards ensuring prompt and final judicial determinations before suppressing expression.
- The Court held the prior-restraint defect was not cured by the fact that a trial judge, rather than an administrative official, issued the temporary restraint.

## Legal Principles

- Prior restraints on communicative activity are subject to stricter constitutional scrutiny than punishment imposed after expression occurs.
- Injunctions that suppress future expression not yet adjudicated unprotected impose a distinct First Amendment injury, including the risk of contempt sanctions for protected speech.
- Systems restraining film exhibition in advance must include stringent procedural safeguards, including prompt judicial review and a prompt final judicial determination of obscenity, with the government bearing the burden.
- A restraint does not become constitutionally acceptable merely because it is ordered by a judge rather than an administrative censor.
- General nuisance-abatement remedies may not be applied to expressive activity in a way that effectively imposes broad, forward-looking bans without safeguards tailored to First Amendment concerns.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Texas could not use its nuisance statutes to impose forward-looking injunctions against a theater’s exhibition of films not yet adjudicated obscene, because the scheme operated as an invalid prior restraint lacking the procedural protections required when the government seeks to suppress expression in advance.


Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980)