## Facts

- A Michigan defendant arranged for a third party to shoot her boyfriend, who she claimed had abused her; the boyfriend survived and could not identify the shooter.
- Years later, during an unrelated homicide investigation involving the same boyfriend, police found the defendant’s journals in his apartment.
- The journals included statements identifying the 1995 shooter and describing the defendant’s role in arranging the shooting.
- The journals also contained prayer-like passages addressed to God and references to the defendant’s religious beliefs.
- The defendant was charged and tried for assault with intent to commit murder for the 1995 shooting.
- At trial, the prosecution introduced selected journal excerpts, including some prayer-form language alongside admissions.
- The defense sought to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome (BWS) and requested a provocation-based mitigation instruction.
- The trial court admitted the journal excerpts but excluded BWS expert testimony and denied the provocation instruction, reasoning that a hired attack did not fit self-defense or heat-of-passion/provocation theories.
- The jury convicted the defendant; state appellate review affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- The defendant sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied.

## Issues

1. Whether admitting journal entries containing prayers and religious language, along with incriminating admissions, violated the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether the Constitution required extending clergy-communicant privilege (or similar protection) to private writings framed as communications to God.
3. Whether excluding BWS expert testimony and denying a provocation instruction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense, as evaluated under AEDPA.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
- The court held that admission of the journal excerpts was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law under the Religion Clauses.
- The court rejected the claim that the Constitution required a privilege covering private writings addressed to God, emphasizing the absence of Supreme Court authority mandating any clergy-communicant privilege.
- The court held that excluding BWS expert testimony and denying a provocation instruction did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent on the right to present a defense, particularly given the hired-shooter facts and state evidentiary limits.
- Because the petitioner did not show an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, AEDPA barred relief.

## Legal Principles

- Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief is available only if the state-court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
- Evidence with religious phrasing may be admitted when offered for probative, nonreligious purposes (e.g., factual admissions) absent clearly established Supreme Court law prohibiting its use in that setting.
- The Supreme Court has not clearly established that the Constitution requires recognition of a clergy-communicant privilege, or extension of any such privilege to private writings framed as communications to God.
- The constitutional right to present a defense is subject to reasonable evidentiary and procedural restrictions; it does not guarantee admission of all defense-favorable evidence or entitlement to a requested instruction without a foundation under applicable law.
- On federal habeas review, alleged errors in state evidence rulings and jury-instruction decisions warrant relief only when they amount to a federal constitutional violation under clearly established Supreme Court law.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit held that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard, Michigan’s admission of prayer-form journal excerpts and its exclusion of BWS testimony and a provocation instruction were not unreasonable applications of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, so the petitioner’s habeas challenge to her conviction failed.


Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2007)