## Facts

- Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989.
- In 1994, he pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security and served four months in prison.
- Under pre-1996 law, a lawful permanent resident returning from an “innocent, casual, and brief” trip abroad was generally not treated as making a new “entry.”
- In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which made “admission” the key concept and provided that an LPR is treated as “seeking admission” if the LPR has committed certain offenses, including crimes involving moral turpitude.
- In January 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece; upon return through JFK Airport, immigration officials treated him as seeking admission because of his 1994 conviction.
- DHS charged him as removable as an inadmissible alien based on the pre-1996 conviction; his counsel conceded removability and sought a discretionary waiver under former INA § 212(c).
- The immigration judge denied relief and ordered removal; the BIA affirmed and later denied reopening based on a retroactivity argument and ineffective assistance claim.
- The Second Circuit denied review, holding there was no impermissible retroactive application and no prejudice from the concession of removability.

## Issues

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (added by IIRIRA) may be applied to a lawful permanent resident whose guilty plea predated IIRIRA, so that the resident is treated as seeking admission after a brief post-IIRIRA trip abroad.
2. Whether applying that provision in this setting has an impermissible retroactive effect by attaching a new legal disability to a pre-IIRIRA conviction and plea.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and remanded, holding (6–3) that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could not be applied retroactively to Vartelas’s 1994 guilty plea.
- The Court concluded that the legal regime in effect at the time of the conviction governed the immigration consequences for his brief travel.
- The Court rejected the government’s argument that the statute operated only prospectively on the post-IIRIRA act of travel.

## Legal Principles

- Federal statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent a clear congressional statement to the contrary.
- A statute has a retroactive effect if it attaches new legal consequences or a new disability to events completed before enactment.
- In the immigration context, IIRIRA’s “seeking admission” rule may not be applied to impose a new travel-related disability on an LPR based solely on a pre-IIRIRA conviction and plea when brief travel previously would not have triggered admission consequences.
- Reliance interests and settled expectations at the time of a guilty plea may be relevant to whether a later-enacted immigration consequence is impermissibly retroactive.

## Conclusion

The Court held that IIRIRA’s provision treating certain lawful permanent residents as seeking admission cannot be applied to convert a pre-1996 guilty plea into a new barrier to reentry after brief travel abroad, absent clear congressional authorization for retroactive operation.


Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)