Facts
- Booker T. Hillery, Jr., a Black defendant, was indicted in 1962 by a Kings County, California, grand jury alleged to have been selected through systematic exclusion of Black citizens.
- Hillery moved to quash the indictment on Equal Protection grounds; the trial court denied the motion.
- Hillery was convicted of first-degree murder in California state court.
- After extensive state post-conviction litigation, the California Supreme Court denied relief in 1978.
- Hillery filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court expanded the record with affidavits and a computer-based statistical analysis addressing whether chance could explain the exclusion of Black jurors.
- The district court granted habeas relief for discriminatory grand jury selection, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review exhaustion and harmless-error questions.
Issues
- Whether the exhaustion requirement was satisfied when the federal habeas court considered supplemental affidavits and statistical analysis not presented in state court on the same grand-jury-discrimination claim.
- Whether proven racial discrimination in selection of the indicting grand jury can be treated as harmless error when the defendant was later convicted after an otherwise fair trial.
- Whether federal habeas relief for discriminatory grand jury selection may be conditioned on delay and the State’s ability to retry the case.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed, 6–3.
- The Court held Hillery satisfied exhaustion because the supplemental evidence did not fundamentally alter the previously presented grand-jury-discrimination claim.
- The Court held racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury that indicted the defendant is not subject to harmless-error analysis and requires vacatur of the conviction.
- The Court rejected conditioning habeas relief on the passage of time or the State’s ability to obtain a second conviction.
- Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, reasoning that Hillery lacked a full and fair state-court opportunity to litigate the discrimination claim.
- Justice Powell dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, favoring a more pragmatic, prejudice-focused approach.
Legal Principles
- A federal habeas petitioner exhausts state remedies when later federal evidentiary supplementation supports, but does not materially transform, the same constitutional claim adjudicated in state court.
- Intentional racial discrimination in selection of the indicting grand jury violates Equal Protection and requires reversal of the conviction obtained on that indictment.
- A subsequent fair trial and reliable verdict do not cure the constitutional taint of an indictment returned by a grand jury selected through racial exclusion.
- The remedy for discriminatory grand jury selection is not reduced through harmless-error review based on the likelihood the indictment would have issued anyway.
- Federal habeas relief for such constitutional violations is not contingent on delay-related retrial difficulties.
Conclusion
The Court held that systematic racial exclusion from the grand jury that indicted a defendant is an Equal Protection violation requiring vacatur of the conviction, even after an otherwise fair trial, and that federal habeas review is not defeated by supplemental proof that does not change the claim or by time-and-retrial concerns.