## Facts

- Two employees of Vaughan and Sons, Inc. (Vaughan) were involved in a motor vehicle collision while working.
- The collision resulted in the deaths of two individuals.
- The State charged Vaughan by information with criminally negligent homicide, alleging the corporation acted “through two of its agents.”
- Vaughan moved to set aside the information, arguing that a corporation could not be held liable for a crime such as criminally negligent homicide.
- The trial court denied the motion.
- A jury found Vaughan guilty of criminally negligent homicide, and the trial court assessed a $5,000 fine under the Penal Code provision governing punishment of corporations.
- The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning there was no plain legislative intent to subject corporations to liability for criminally negligent homicide.
- The State sought discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

## Issues

1. Whether a corporation is a “person” subject to prosecution and conviction for criminally negligent homicide under the Texas Penal Code.
2. Whether the Texas Penal Code provisions on criminal responsibility of corporations permit attributing an agent’s criminal negligence to the corporation for purposes of criminally negligent homicide.

## Decision

- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a corporation may be prosecuted and convicted for criminally negligent homicide under the Texas Penal Code.
- The court rejected the court of appeals’ view that homicide offenses were outside the reach of the Penal Code’s entity-liability rules absent a clearer statement from the Legislature.
- The court relied on the Penal Code’s definition of “person,” which includes corporations, and the statute governing criminal responsibility of corporations for agent conduct.
- The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and fine.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Texas Penal Code, the statutory definition of “person” includes corporations, so offenses applicable to “persons” may apply to corporate entities unless the Code provides otherwise.
- Texas law allows a corporation to be held criminally responsible for an offense committed through the conduct of its agents when the statutory conditions for entity liability are satisfied (including conduct within the scope of employment and on the corporation’s behalf).
- Courts apply the Penal Code’s text as written; policy concerns about a corporation’s ability to “intend” do not justify reading corporations out of statutes that expressly include them.
- Corporate criminal liability is not limited to regulatory offenses; it can apply to crimes with culpable mental states, including criminal negligence, through attribution of an agent’s mental state to the entity as authorized by statute.
- When the charging instrument alleges corporate action through agents in a manner that tracks the entity-liability statute, it can support prosecution of the corporation for the underlying offense.

## Conclusion

*Vaughan and Sons v. State* holds that, under the Texas Penal Code’s definition of “person” and its corporate criminal-responsibility provisions, a corporation may be prosecuted and convicted of criminally negligent homicide based on the conduct of agents acting within the scope of their employment, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated the corporation’s conviction and fine after the court of appeals had reversed for lack of legislative intent.


Vaughan and Sons v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805 (1987)