## Facts

- Weather-Mastic, Inc., a nonunion insulation and weather-proofing contractor, obtained a subcontract on a union-controlled job where workers needed union credentials or “working cards” to be permitted to work.
- Frank Paul Ventimiglia, Weather-Mastic’s labor relations adviser and a former union business agent, and James Harold Parran, the company’s general manager, sought working cards for Weather-Mastic employees.
- Joseph Martin was the business agent of a local union whose customary duties included negotiating labor terms and handling grievances for union members.
- Martin learned that Weather-Mastic employees had working cards not issued by him and discussed the situation with Ventimiglia and Parran.
- Ventimiglia and Parran persuaded Martin to issue working cards to Weather-Mastic employees in exchange for $100 per month.
- Martin issued the working cards and delivered them to Ventimiglia; Martin received multiple monthly payments.
- Martin did not negotiate wages or working conditions for Weather-Mastic employees and did not handle disputes or grievances on their behalf.

## Issues

1. Whether Martin qualified as a “representative of any of [the employer’s] employees” under 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) based solely on issuing working cards for payment.
2. Whether a conspiracy conviction can stand when the agreed-upon conduct, as a matter of law, would not constitute a violation of § 186(a).

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit reversed the conspiracy convictions.
- The court held the evidence insufficient because Martin was not a “representative” of Weather-Mastic’s employees within the meaning of § 186(a).
- Because the contemplated payments were not criminal under § 186(a) on these facts, there could be no conspiracy to violate that statute.

## Legal Principles

- Section 186(a) prohibits employer payments only to a payee who is, in fact, a “representative” of the employer’s employees in the statutory sense; union office alone is not enough absent an actual representational relationship.
- A defendant may be convicted of conspiracy even if the substantive offense is not completed, but not where the agreed act is not unlawful (and is not to be carried out by unlawful means).
- When an essential statutory element of the target offense cannot be satisfied on the proved facts, a conviction for conspiracy to commit that offense cannot stand.

## Conclusion

The court set aside the conspiracy convictions because the government failed to prove that the union business agent functioned as a representative of the employer’s employees under § 186(a); without that element, the payments were outside the statute and could not support conspiracy liability.


Ventimiglia v. United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957)