Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)

Facts

  • A Long Island village adopted a zoning ordinance limiting land use in certain areas to “one-family dwellings.”
  • The ordinance defined “family” as persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage living as one household, and allowed no more than two unrelated persons to live together as a household.
  • The ordinance excluded uses such as boarding, lodging, fraternity, and multiple-dwelling houses.
  • A homeowner leased a house to a tenant who lived there with five other university students; all six occupants were unrelated.
  • The village cited the property for violating the ordinance’s occupancy limitation.
  • The owners and tenants sued, alleging violations of equal protection and asserted rights of association, travel, and privacy.
  • The district court upheld the ordinance; the court of appeals reversed on equal protection grounds; the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the ordinance.
  • Before Supreme Court review concluded, the student tenants moved out.

Issues

  1. Whether a zoning ordinance limiting “one-family” occupancy to related persons (or no more than two unrelated persons) violates the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal protection or infringing asserted rights of association, travel, or privacy.
  2. Whether the dispute became moot after the tenant plaintiffs vacated the house.

Decision

  • The Court held the case was not moot because the ordinance continued to affect the property’s value.
  • The Court upheld the ordinance, concluding it did not burden a fundamental right and did not draw a suspect classification.
  • Applying rational basis review, the Court found the ordinance reasonable and rationally related to permissible governmental objectives associated with single-family residential zoning.
  • The Court rejected claims that the ordinance unconstitutionally restricted association or privacy, reasoning that it did not bar other forms of association and regulated occupancy for land-use purposes.
  • Justice Brennan dissented on mootness, arguing no live controversy remained after the tenants moved.
  • Justice Marshall dissented on the merits, arguing the ordinance impermissibly restricted household choice and associational freedom and warranted more searching review.
  • Land-use regulations that do not burden a recognized fundamental right and do not employ a suspect classification are reviewed under rational basis scrutiny.
  • A municipality may define “family” for single-family zoning to favor related household units, and the Constitution permits such social and economic line-drawing if not arbitrary or capricious.
  • Preserving a quiet residential character, limiting density-related effects (such as traffic, parking, and noise), and favoring traditional family-oriented neighborhoods are legitimate governmental objectives for zoning.
  • A case challenging an ordinance is not moot where the ordinance continues to impose concrete effects on property interests, such as diminishing property value.

Conclusion

The Court sustained a municipality’s single-family zoning definition that limited unrelated cohabitants, holding the ordinance was a rational land-use measure that neither implicated suspect classifications nor infringed a fundamental constitutional right, and further held the dispute remained justiciable despite the tenants’ departure because the ordinance continued to affect the property.