## Facts

- A funeral home owned a two-level asphalt parking lot connected by ramps; one ramp had an approximately 14% grade.
- The lot was initially rough asphalt, but the upper level and parts of the ramps were later coated with a clear sealer that created a smoother surface that became slick when wet.
- The boundary between the rough, unsealed surface and the smooth, sealed surface was only slightly different in color and was difficult to discern at night in dim lighting.
- On a rainy evening, an invitee parked on the lower level and walked up the ramp toward the funeral home, stepping from the rough surface onto the sealed surface and slipping and falling.
- The invitee had previously used the lower level but had not walked on the sealed upper level and did not know of the surface change or the wet-weather hazard.
- Evidence showed the funeral home’s personnel knew the sealed area was slippery when wet; patrons had complained about slickness during rain, and sand was sometimes spread on the area.
- At trial, the court admitted testimony about patrons’ complaints and about other slips or falls occurring in the lot under wet conditions.
- A jury returned a verdict for the invitee, and judgment was entered for $13,000.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported findings that the parking lot condition posed an unreasonable risk to invitees and that the hazard was not discoverable by the plaintiff using ordinary care.
2. Whether testimony that others complained the lot was slippery when wet was inadmissible hearsay or admissible to show the defendant’s notice and knowledge.
3. Whether evidence of other slips or falls was admissible where incidents occurred at other times or locations, or whether dissimilarity and prejudice required exclusion.
4. Whether the plaintiff’s verdict-directing instruction was legally sufficient.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
- The court held there was substantial evidence for the jury to find an unreasonably dangerous condition not readily discoverable by the plaintiff, given the ramp’s grade, the sealed surface’s wet-weather slickness, the abrupt surface change, and low visibility at night.
- The court held testimony about complaints was admissible as non-hearsay when offered to prove notice and knowledge (that complaints were made), not to prove the surface was in fact slippery.
- The court held evidence of other accidents was properly admitted where incidents were shown to have occurred under substantially similar conditions and the trial court reasonably balanced probative value against risks of confusion or unfair prejudice.
- The court rejected challenges to the verdict-directing instruction, finding the essential elements were sufficiently submitted and that preservation problems also defeated some objections.

## Legal Principles

- A premises owner may be liable to invitees for injuries caused by a condition that creates an unreasonable risk of harm when the owner knew or should have known of the condition and failed to make it reasonably safe or warn, and the danger was not reasonably discoverable by the invitee.
- An out-of-court statement is not hearsay when offered to show notice or knowledge—i.e., that the statement was made to the defendant—rather than to prove the truth of its content.
- Evidence of other accidents may be admitted to prove the existence of a dangerous condition and the defendant’s knowledge when the proponent shows substantial similarity and the trial court finds the probative value outweighs risks of unfair prejudice, surprise, or confusion, with fair opportunity for cross-examination.
- Trial courts have discretion in evidentiary rulings on similar-accident evidence and in determining whether instructions adequately hypothesize the material facts and elements.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a slip-and-fall verdict where a sealed, wet-weather-slick ramp on a steep grade was difficult to detect at night, and it approved admission of prior complaints to prove notice and substantially similar other-accident evidence to prove both the condition and the owner’s knowledge.


Vinyard v. Vinyard Funeral Home, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)